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 Abstract 
 
This study is dedicated to identifying the elements of continuity and 
discontinuity of American foreign policy towards Palestine from Nixon to Clinton. 
The importance of this research is derived from the fact that it explores the 
American-Palestinian relations through a very long period of time through which 
many major international changes occurred as well as internal changes within the 
Palestinian and American fronts. Moreover, the long time period covered in this 
research gives a clear idea about to which extend these variables dominate American 
behavior towards Palestine. 
This study is divided into three chapters other than the introduction and 
conclusion. The first chapter is divided into three parts. The first part is dedicated to 
giving a general overview of American foreign policy from a theoretical point of 
view. The second part is detected to examining American foreign policy towards the 
Middle East. The third and last part gives a historic overview of American foreign 
policy towards Palestine prior to the Nixon era to pinpoint the historical background 
that established this relationship. 
The second chapter explores American foreign policy towards Palestine from 
the Nixon era to George Bush senior. The chapter is divided according to the 
presidential periods as a mean to identify the elements of continuity and discontinuity 
in the American approach towards Palestine for each president. 
 The third chapter is dedicated to the Clinton tenure going through all the 
agreements signed between Palestinians and Israelis in order to highlight the main 
elements that controlled the relationship during that era. 
The conclusion presents the constant variables in American foreign policy 
towards Palestine as well as giving some recommendations to improving the 
Palestinian-American relationship exploring other options Palestinians must tackle to 
improve their negotiation status and international performance. These conclusions 
could be summarized as follows: 
1- American behavior towards Palestine is governed by the special 
American-Israeli relationship.  
2- The U.S. tends to adopt the Israeli interpretation on the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict neglecting the Palestinian perspective 
as well as refusing that the root of the conflict is the 
establishment of the Israeli state on the Palestinian land. 
3- The U.S. supports Israel in creating facts on the ground that 
would jeopardize the outcome of any future peace talks between 
Palestinians and Israelis through buying time in negotiations for 
the benefit of Israel. 
4- The U.S. tends to achieve political gains on behalf of Israel 
through exerting pressure on Palestinians to recognize the state of 
Israel and its right to exist and then to adhere to Israeli demands 
through negotiations regardless of Palestinian interests. 
 5- The U.S. tends to overturn Palestinian achievements within the 
United Nations through liquidating Palestinian rights and lawful 
political aspirations. The U.S. generally manipulates legal terms 
to undermine Palestinian rights and it isolates itself from 
International consensus. 
6- The U.S. intervenes in the conflict to ensure the containment of 
the conflict so it would not develop into regional unrest. 
7- Palestinians should no longer perceive the U.S. as a reliable 
broker of peace as it would not serve their interests. 
8- The E.U. should be encouraged by Palestinians to be more 
involved in the conflict to counterbalance the American 
monopoly over it. 
9- Palestinians should not give up on American public. A public 
relations company should be hired to work on improving 
Palestinian image within American society and Palestinian and 
Arab Americans should be mobilized to create a pressure group 
to counter the influence of pro-Israel groups. 
10- Working on the Arab front should be a target to Palestinians. 
Arabs should be approached to convince Arabs to give up the 
unilateral track of the Arab-Israeli peace talks. 
 11- Finally, Palestinians should work on reforming and improving 
their institution’s performance to be able to improve their 
international performance and to gain international trust. 
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A 
Introduction 
Ever since the declaration of the Israeli state, Palestinians have been engaged 
not only in a war of liberation but also a war of recognition. Since most of the world 
decided to ignore Palestinians as a separate people with the right of self-
determination and statehood, Palestinians have used both diplomacy and armed 
resistance to gain these legitimate rights. 
As part of the Arab world, Palestinians depended at first on Arab nations to 
transmit their demands to the world. By the mid 1950s, doubts started to arise among 
Palestinians as to whether the Arab states were pursuing Palestinian interests or 
instead pursuing their own interests at the expense of Palestinian rights. The outbreak 
of the 1967 war and the humiliating defeat of the Arab armies that lead to the 
occupation of the rest of historic Palestine, as well as other parts of three other Arab 
countries, made Palestinians lose their last shred of hope that the Arab states would 
assist them in gaining their rights. From that moment, Palestinians decided to rely on 
themselves in their struggle for independence and recognition. 
By the late 1960s, Palestinians gained a political breakthrough internationally 
through a series of UN General Assembly resolutions recognizing Palestinians as a 
separate people and granting them all lawful rights, including the right of self-
determination and liberation and the right of struggle to gain that goal.  However, this 
advance was hindered by continuous Israeli violations of UN resolutions and 
American support for Israel. The United States, in practice, refused to deal with 
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Palestinians as a people of a sovereign nation. Palestinian claims were looked upon as 
unrealistic, neglecting the root of the conflict. The U.S. administration adopted solely 
the Israeli interpretation of the conflict.  
Being one of the two super powers during the Cold War and the major power 
in the post Cold War era, the U.S. had been playing a major role in the Palestinian 
situation. Despite the fact that the international community made several attempts to 
present solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Israeli rejection of such 
gestures and its insistence that only its closest ally, the U.S., should be involved in the 
conflict drove those attempts to a dead end. The American role has been marked for 
decades as being alienated from the international consensus, giving Israel the chance 
to dictate its own terms in almost all matters related to the conflict. 
The aim of this thesis is to reach a full understanding and evaluation of the 
elements of continuity and discontinuity in the American foreign policy towards 
Palestine. In this work, the author will show that there are constant variables that have 
governed the American approach towards Palestine from the period of the Nixon 
administration up to the Clinton administration. To reach that goal, the research 
identifies these variables and examines their role in the American process of decision 
making towards Palestine and the different stages through which American-
Palestinian relations have passed.  
Two research methods will be used in this work. The first will be historic, 
which is useful due to the long time period covered. Alongside the historic method, 
the author will rely on the analytical method, especially when dealing with official 
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documents and statements. Due to the diversity of issues covered, the analytical 
method is also important in connecting these issues and reaching a precise and 
accurate conclusion. 
This work covers the two major stages through which the Palestinian question 
developed. The first stage covers the period from Nixon to Bush Senior, while the 
second stage covers the Clinton tenure. But why choose such a long period? The 
advent of Nixon’s presidency coincided with the most important stage in recent 
Palestinian history since during his years in power, Palestinians started to recover 
from the great shock they had received from the 1967 war which led to a new influx 
of refugees and gave a new legal status to the Palestinians. Palestinians became not 
only refugees but also civilians under occupation. During the Nixon era, the 
Palestinian national resistance movement came to light, attracting the attention of the 
world to the Palestinian question. Despite the international recognition of Palestinians 
as a people, Palestinians were generally ignored by the subsequent American 
administrations.  
During Clinton’s tenure, Palestinian efforts to gain American recognition 
were crowned; for the first time in the history of Palestine, a Palestinian national 
leader was welcomed not only to America but also to the White House as a friend and 
not a foe. On the other hand, the Clinton administrations are worth studying because 
they affected the destiny of Palestinians for generations to come through a serious of 
decisions and policies that undermined some of the international gains Palestinians 
had achieved. During Clinton’s eight years in office, the peace agreement between 
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Palestinians and Israelis was signed along with other agreements that, until the 
outbreak of the Intifada, were essential in preserving peace in the region. The U.S. 
played an initial role, sometimes as a mediator, others as a catalyst in each agreement. 
By the end of his tenure, the peace process was breaking down, with Palestinian-
American relations at their lowest point since the signing of the peace agreement in 
1993.  
This work is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter gives a 
general overview of American international behavior from a theoretical perspective. 
Moreover, it highlights the importance of the Middle East in American foreign policy 
to place the Palestinian question within its general framework. The third section of 
this chapter gives a short history of the American approach towards Palestine prior to 
1967 and the internal elements that affected policy makers while dealing with 
Palestine. The importance of this part lies in the fact that during this period the 
American perspective of the conflict was formed.   
The second chapter deals with the period from Nixon to Bush Senior. It 
examines the American approach through this period by going through the attitudes 
and practices of each president towards Palestine. By dividing this period in this way, 
the author tackles the internal and external factors affecting the process of policy 
making towards Palestine.   
The third chapter is dedicated to examining the Clinton tenure. The chapter is 
divided according to the agreements and major events that took place in those eight 
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years. Dividing the chapter this way is helpful in drawing an accurate picture of the 
ups and downs that Palestinian-American relations went through during this period. 
The conclusion is devoted to pointing out the constant variables in the 
American foreign policy towards Palestine. 
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1 
Chapter I 
America and the World 
 
1. American Foreign Policy in Theory: 
This section will explain the general framework of American foreign policy 
and the way in which the U.S. conducts its relations with other states and 
international entities. Explaining American international behavior from a theoretical 
point of view is important because, as Stanley Michalak explains, when things “are 
categorized we understand or comprehend them by looking at the attributes of the 
categories into which they have been placed.”1 
Placing the Palestinian question within the context of the general behavior of 
American foreign policy helps in understanding the changes in American-Palestinian 
relations, if any indeed occurred. 
 
A. Historical Background: 
One of the theories that explain American foreign policy is the “Cyclical 
Theory”. This theory is based on the assumption that American foreign policy 
revolves around two tendencies: Introversion and Extroversion. The former is marked 
by concentrating on internal affairs while keeping normal relations with the 
international community. During this phase, decision-makers re-evaluate past 
international policies and determine future ones. On the other hand, the Extroversion 
                                                 
1
 Stanley J. Michalak, Competing Conceptions of American Foreign Policy: Worldviews in Conflict 
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stage is marked by the interventionist international role. The extroversion stage can 
either be of an aggressive or cooperative nature, depending on the issue in question.2 
Following the Monroe Doctrine in 1822, America went through an 
introversion stage, keeping friendly relations with others in order to protect its 
economic interests. No military action was taken by the U.S. outside its continent 
until the outbreak of World War I, where it shifted to the extroversion stage. Securing 
the European continent and restoring the balance of power were the main reasons 
behind this shift, though as soon as the war ended in favor of American interests, the 
U.S. went back to the introversion stage. 
In 1939, World War II drove the U.S. back to the extroversion stage. Unlike 
WWI, the end of WWII did not restore the balance of power in Europe; consequently, 
the U.S. remained in the extroversion stage. The great European powers came out of 
the war devastated, both militarily and economically, leaving a political void in the 
continent. The rise of the USSR as a great power with no compatible power in 
Central Europe was a threat to the United States. The U.S. feared that the USSR 
would spread its influence and ideology into Europe and take over the lost colonies 
that used to be under European control.3 Being the only power capable of facing the 
Soviet threat, the U.S. increased its international involvement. 
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B. American Foreign Policy during the Cold War Era 
The Cold War was marked by the struggle between the two Super Powers 
over world dominance, dividing the world into two blocks: pro-American and pro-
Soviet. After the division of Germany, Europe was divided between the two blocks 
according to the military situation on the ground. The United States challenged Soviet 
dominance only when it tried to cross its sphere of influence and spread its power and 
communist ideology.4 
Two main views dominated the mentality of American policy makers, at least 
until the defeat in Vietnam. Idealists believed that they could deal with the Soviet 
Union through open negotiations characterized by goodwill and self-sacrifice. In 
contrast, realists did not have faith in the ability to solve disputes through 
negotiations and goodwill.5 
On the ground, Realism won the battle, especially after the adoption of 
George Kenan’s views on the Soviet Union published in an article titled “The Source 
of Soviet Conduct”. As a counselor at the American Embassy in Moscow, Kenan was 
capable of convincing American policy makers of his views as an expert. Kenan 
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wrote that “the Soviets were expansionistic, and their hostility to the West was 
inherent in their ideology and their situation.”6   
Is Realism the only theory capable of explaining American international 
behavior during the Cold War? The answer is definitely no; however, Realism is the 
theory that can best provide an explanation of the American behavior. For Hans 
Morgenthau, the founder of Realism, interest is defined in terms of power.7 This 
concept is very much applicable to American behavior during the Cold War. Both 
Super Powers were trying to spread their dominance throughout the international 
community, expanding their spheres of control. The United States went through an 
arms race with its rival that, had it escalated to the level of armed confrontation, 
could have lead to a global nuclear disaster. 
It would be an over-simplification to evaluate all American attitudes and 
behaviors from a realist point of view, however, without considering the effect other 
theories have had on American policy makers. The U.S. did use military power to 
expand its power, but at the same it used economic aid and assistance programs as 
means of conduct with nations of the world.   
C. American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era 
The end of the Cold War reshaped the international arena. The international 
system was no longer a bipolar system. However, as Samual Huntington affirms, 
despite the fact that there is only one superpower, the world is not uni-polar. Instead, 
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according to Huntington, the world is a uni-multi-polar system with one super power 
and several major powers. The U.S. is that superpower. The other major powers are 
regional, and despite their strength, they cannot spread their interests and capabilities 
outside their own regions. There are also powers, which he called secondary regional 
powers, whose interests usually contradict those of the major regional powers.8  
John Ikenberry holds a different view. For him, the so-called post-Cold War 
order does not exist. The collapse of the USSR did not create a new system; it 
brought back the world order created in the 1940s. Actually, according to Ikenberry, 
the advent of the Cold War reinforced the liberal democratic order of the 1940s.9 
This drastic change in the international system, in addition to the 
disappearance of the most important aspect behind the U.S. international 
involvement, brought back the dilemma facing the future of American foreign policy. 
Some scholars believed that the end of the Cold War should have brought the U.S. 
back to the introversion stage. Others believed that the U.S. would still have to play 
its role as the world’s leader and policeman. The fact that the Cold War lasted for 
almost half a century made it appealing to believe that classical isolationism was dead 
and could not be revived. To a certain extent, this was true. During the Cold War, the 
U.S. became an integral part of the international system. The Truman Doctrine, the 
                                                 
8
 Samual P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” in American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, 
4th ed.  (New York: Longman, 2002), 587. 
9John Ikenberry, “The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos,” in American Foreign Policy, 606-607. 
  
6 
Marshal plan, NATO, other security pacts, and overseas troop deployments that took 
place after the end of the Second World War cannot just be ignored or repudiated.10 
There are five difficulties facing U.S. international engagement for the sake of 
a stable international order. First, the end of the cold war put an end to the pull-factor 
from which American foreign policy was derived for almost 40 years. Second, there 
has been an increasing trend among Americans to limit their international 
commitments and involvement. A 1995 survey conducted by the Time Mirror showed 
that 41% of Americans were in favor of limiting American involvement abroad. This 
percentage was the highest since the survey’s inception in 1974. Third, in the near 
future, the emergence of economic globalization would reinforce the American 
public’s tendency to resent American international involvement. The negative effects 
of globalization, especially on wages and market uncertainty, made people believe 
that it was in their best interest to withdraw from world affairs. Fourth, the end of the 
Cold War made realism insufficient in framing American foreign policy.11 Finally, 
the end of the Cold War brought with it a problem for Americans: the identifying of 
American national interests. Sub-commercial interests, transnational and non-national 
ethnic interests became dominant in the foreign policy.12 Realism was no longer 
capable of explaining in full the American foreign policy. After the end of the Cold 
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War, three competing grand strategies emerged, each one offering its own premises 
and predictions concerning the future of American foreign policy.  
These strategies are: 
 
1) Selective Engagement: its advocates drive their perception from the realist theory 
focusing on the concept of power. The Post-Cold War era cannot produce a balance 
of power. States deter each other, but they still need a leader that is capable of 
maintaining this balance of power. The U.S., for them, should claim that role.   
2) Cooperative Security: its advocates derive their ideology from liberal theory. They 
believe that the U.S. has a huge national interest in world peace. The U.S. should 
work collectively with international institutions as much as possible. 
3) Primacy: just like Selective Engagement, it is motivated by power and peace. 
Maintaining the Primacy, which emerged after the end of the Cold War, is vital for 
both world peace and American national security. 13 
By looking into American foreign policy on the ground, one can conclude that 
the best theory explaining such behavior is Neo-liberalism. Realism lost its ground 
when it could not predict the peaceful ending of the Cold War. Moreover, the 
economic suffering of the Soviet Union gave strength to liberal thinking.14  
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2.  American Involvement in the Middle East 
              American involvement in the Middle East has never been easy since it is a 
region filled with political uncertainties and hostility. Conflicts between Middle 
Eastern states are common, and political differences are wide enough to create a source 
for vulnerable conflicts. Iran is seen as a threat to the Gulf States; Saddam Hussein of 
Iraq was a source of threat not only to the Middle East but also the whole world; 
Turkey is a major military power in the region, with its relations with Israel and 
growing alliance with the West; and finally, the most complicated and dangerous, is the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.15 
A. Interests: 
              Internal problems are not the only causes of difficulty in maintaining 
American interests in the region. The conflicting nature of these interests has been a 
nightmare to a number of American administrations, with each president trying to 
balance his policies to pursue even-handed policies in the region., particularly with 
regard to American interests in Arab oil and the security of Israel. On the one hand, too 
much emphasis on securing Arab oil or pro-Arab policies would invoke negative 
reactions from the Jewish lobby and pro-Israel supporters, which would be damaging 
for any president or presidential candidate. On the other hand, pro-Israel policies could 
trigger a rise in oil prices and threaten the existence of pro-American Arab regimes.16 
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A.1 Oil: 
A.1.a History: 
               World War II pinpointed the importance of the Middle East to the United 
States. Before WWII, U.S. involvement in the Middle East was restricted to the 
protection of its economic interests, with limited political involvement. During WWII, 
however, America was responsible for supplying almost 70% of the energy sources 
needed during the war, making it almost impossible to rely completely on American 
national energy sources. The need for external energy sources brought the Middle East, 
especially the Gulf States, to the attention of American policy makers and 
businessmen. In a speech dated February 18 1943, Theodore Roosevelt pointed out the 
importance of Arab oil, stating that Saudi Arabia had become very important to 
American national security.17 
                Moreover, by the end of the war, oil prices were booming in the international 
market, causing a dramatic shortage of dollar reserves in almost all European states. As 
a consequence, oil became a very important commodity in reviving the European 
economy, a mission taken very seriously by the U.S. More than 10% of the financial 
aid given to Europe was spent on oil, generating increasing demand over Western 
petroleum products. The U.S. feared that the increase in this trend would have a 
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negative effect on its national oil reserves. To overcome these difficulties, the U.S. 
encouraged its private oil companies to seek oil sources in the Middle East.18 
 
A.1.b Cold War era: 
                The importance of oil in the Gulf is not due to the amount imported by the 
U.S. since it constitutes only 10% of domestic use; the Gulf oil is important due to its 
impact on the international economy. The Gulf produces almost 55% of the world’s oil 
reserves, and during the Cold War, the U.S. did not want that oil to fall into the hands 
of hostile enemies. The Gulf oil can also be used as an indirect means to influence 
Europe and Japan, who depend much more on Gulf oil than the U.S.; 30% of European 
oil imports and nearly 80% of Japan’s come from the Gulf.19 
                Being a net importer of oil in the 1970s, the U.S. became vulnerable to any 
change in oil policies in the Middle East.20 The 1973 war strengthened the American 
fear that Arabs would use oil as a strategic weapon. However, to overcome this 
problem, the U.S. achieved a breakthrough in March 1974, ensuring that Arab oil 
would not be used any more as a strategic weapon. Kissinger took measures to put an 
end to the boycott and to eliminate any future attempts. In a press conference in 
November 1973, he clearly stated that the U.S. would take counter measures against 
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countries that joined the boycott. Furthermore, he also used economic incentives to 
persuade Arab countries to terminate the boycott.21 
 
 
 
A.1.c Post Cold War era: 
               The end of the Cold War did not affect the importance of oil for America. 
Despite the fact that oil became a market commodity, reducing the threat of its being 
used for political means, the oil market witnessed changes that worked against 
American interests.22 
A.2 Safeguarding Israel: 
A.2.a Opposing views:  
               Many attempts have been made to evaluate the American-Israeli relationship 
and its nature; the outcomes of that research have always been controversial. Two 
interpretations dominate the outcomes of such research that are viable during and after 
the Cold War. First, some scholars believe that the American policy-making process is 
mainly dominated by Zionist and pro-Israeli views. Advocates of this analysis give 
many examples to strengthen their interpretation. For example, George Ball, former 
Undersecretary of State, explained the American reaction to the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982 as follows: “Rather than pursuing our own objectives and looking out 
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for our own interests, we have offered ourselves to the Israeli government as the 
uncritical, undemanding supporter of its objectives, prepared to help it achieve goals 
not our own and then sweep up the breakage created by its violent pursuit of excessive 
ambitions.”23 
               On the other hand, there are researchers who believe that Israel in fact serves 
American interests in the region and that Israel is a reliable collaborator in strategic, 
political and economic goals within and beyond the Middle East.24 Moreover, this 
unique relationship between Israel and the U.S. is due to the symmetric nature of the 
parties’ interests. Advocates of this approach usually go back to statements made by 
American politicians that bolster this perception. For example, Kenneth Organski 
reached the conclusion that U.S. policy toward Israel is based on foreign policy reasons 
rather than domestic pressure or any other factor, stating: “U.S. policy decisions with 
respect to Israel have, in the main, been made by presidents and presidential foreign 
policy elites both by themselves and for reasons entirely their own. When the U.S. did 
not see Israel supporting U.S. interests in stemming the expansion of the Soviet 
influence, it did not help Israel. When U.S. leaders . . . decided that Israel could be an 
asset in the U.S. struggle with radical Arabs who were perceived as Soviet clients, they 
helped Israel.”25 
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               What gives Israel a privilege in its relation with the U.S. is the strong sense of 
resemblance in the minds of Americans between the way the two states were created 
and the difficulties they face. Americans believe that they share biblical heritage with 
Israel. They also believe that they share the same Western democratic values.26   
 
 
 
B. Threats: 
American interests in the Middle East face a variety of threats that changed with the 
course of time. 
B.1 Cold War era: 
B.1.a The Soviet Union: 
               The first major threat to the American interest in the Middle East was the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War. The U.S. was aware that the Soviet Union had 
interests in the Middle East and feared that the spread of Soviet influence in the region 
would affect its dominance over Arab oil. In doing so, the Soviets would have been 
able not only to prevent the U.S. from obtaining oil resources, but also to dominate a 
very important segment of its economy. Moreover, European States would have been 
driven into the Soviet block in order to sustain their oil supplies from the Gulf.27  
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               The Soviet Union did not only threaten American economic interests in the 
Middle East. The U.S. was also worried that the Soviets would supply unfriendly Arab 
states with nuclear weapons and support Arab Nationalist Movements. 
B.1.b Arab Nationalist Movements: 
                 In the 1940s, the U.S. was trying to counter the spread of Arab nationalist 
movements which called for the termination of Arab dependence on the West and were 
against American dominance in the region. It is true that some alliances were made 
during the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy years with some nationalist movements, 
but they were exceptions. Between 1955 and 1970, U.S. policy was in opposition to 
secular Arab nationalism led by Abd El-Nasser of Egypt.28 
                 After the death of Nasser, Egypt became a close ally to America, but the 
threat of nationalists did not disappear completely. Arab nationalism was still alive in 
Syria and Iraq through their Ba’thist regimes.  
B.2 Post Cold War Era: 
                The end of the Cold War did not put an end to American fears towards Arab 
nationalist movements. During the Iraq-Iran war, Saddam Hussein received great 
support from the U.S. as part of its Dual Containment policy. The end of the war, 
however, made the U.S. fear the growing military and economic power Iraq possessed 
at the time. Iraq had become a threat to the American-friendly Gulf states and Israel. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait materialized that fear. As a reaction to the Iraqi invasion, 
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the U.S. created a coalition through a huge number of UN resolutions aiming at the 
termination of the Iraqi presence in Kuwait. 
                Sanctions and war against Iraq did not leave American interests immune or 
safe from other threats. These newly realized threats would mainly target elites with 
close relationships to the U.S.29 Though these threats seemed new, the U.S. was aware 
of them. The end of the Cold War brought to the surface their importance to policy 
makers, putting them on top of the priority list when dealing with the region. The most 
dominant threat was the so-called militant Islamic movements and trends.  
B.2.a Militant Islamic Movements: 
                 In April 1993, acting coordinator for counterturns, Laurence Pope, noted: 
“Twenty years ago in the Arab world, secular nationalism was the preferred ideology. 
And so it was the ideology that terrorists adopted as a cover for their actions. 
Increasingly, it’s Islamic ideology, extremist Islamic ideology, which provides that 
cover.”30 
                 There were two reasons behind perceiving Islamic ideology as a threat. The 
first was the outbreak of the Iranian revolution and its effect on oil revenues. The 
importance of Iran to American policy makers was not only restricted to its huge oil 
resources. Having an anti-American regime in Iran would also threaten American-
friendly Gulf states and their oil. Serving as an aspiration for Islamists in the region and 
beyond, the Iranian Islamic regime threatened American allies and put pressure on Gulf 
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governments to change their relationship with America.31 A U.S. official said: “The 
Iranian experience extremely conditioned U.S. thinking about the violent, anti-
American nature of fundamentalist Islam.”32 The use of the word “nature” indicates the 
American perspective that “fundamental Islam” is constant, making it a contentious 
and perpetual threat against America. 
                Ironically, the U.S. used Islam as a weapon against the Soviet Union in the 
Cold War during the height of the Iranian revolution. In the name of Islam, the U.S. 
supported Islamic movements in Afghanistan to eliminate the Soviet dominance at the 
time. When the Soviets interfered militarily to support their client against Islamic 
movements, the U.S. supported these movements, providing them with financial and 
political support. 
                The second reason for America to view Islam as a threat is that it had not 
been attacked on its own soil nor witnessed war on its own ground since the end of the 
Civil War until 1993 when, supposedly in the name of Islam, America was attacked at 
home. In 1993, the World Trade Center in New York was bombed. Ten Muslims were 
convicted of waging war on the U.S. and its allies; in the same year, President Mubarak 
of Egypt, a close ally of the U.S., was subjected to an assassination attempt by the same 
group that attacked the WTC.33 
                This research focuses on the American attitude towards one special part 
within the Middle East: Palestine. The issue of Palestine is at the core of the Arab-
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Israeli conflict, which dominates the agenda of American foreign policy in the region. 
The next section gives a brief history of the way American thinking has been shaped 
through the past decades in regards to the issue of Palestine. 
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3. American Involvement in Palestine: Historical Background: 
Due to the interrelated and integrated history of Palestine and Israel, Israeli-
American relations play a crucial role in Palestinian-American relations. Since 
Woodward Wilson, the U.S. has committed itself to the Zionist program in Palestine, 
and American foreign policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been viewed 
from an Israeli perspective, thereby marring the Palestinian point of view. 
Disregarding the root of the conflict, the Palestinian disposition in 1948, made 
it almost impossible for U.S. policy makers to have a full and unbiased picture of the 
conflict. For half a century, until 1993 when Israel and the Palestinians signed the 
peace agreement, the dominant assumption prevailing among American policy 
makers was that the Palestinian position was “mischievously inspired” and derived by 
“unreasoned hatred”.34  
 
A. Rooted Beliefs: 
A.1 History: 
The current American frame of reference towards the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict was not formed with the creation of the State of Israel or when Zionism 
became a force in Palestine and the United States. It started in the 19th century, when 
Westerners started to visit Palestine, the “Holy Land”. The Westerners returned home 
with certain assumptions about the land and its people, most of which were negative. 
                                                 
34
 Kathleen Christison, “Blind Spots: Official U.S. Myths about the Middle East,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies 17, Issue 2 (Winter 1988): 46. 
  
19 
Arabs in general were commonly perceived as wild, cruel robbers. The significant 
religious status of Palestine made it attractive to Orientalists who perceived 
Palestinians as being aliens in their own homeland. In their writings, Palestinians 
were referred to as “Arabs”, without giving them any special identity. “The 
assumption that the real Palestine was not Muslim or Arab but Christian and/or 
Jewish constituted a symbolic dispossession of the Palestinians and gained hold of the 
Western imagination before the first Zionist settlers ever conceived of migrating to 
Palestine” 35  
By the end of the 1920s, the idea that Palestine was a Jewish land had become 
firmly established. The U.S. was committed to supporting Zionism, and Wilson’s 
successors in the 1920s were more tied to Zionism than he had been. In the late 
1920s, U.S. Jews were still a small minority even though they were skilled and well 
organized. Yet in this early period, they had monopoly over public views and were 
capable of playing an important role in shaping U.S. policy towards Palestine. The 
fact that the American public held a negative perception towards Palestinians, had no 
knowledge of the political issues surrounding the Palestinian conflict, and the absence 
of any counter movement or argument against the Zionist claims helped Zionists in 
formulating American public opinion in their favor. There were no Palestinian 
lobbyists in this era attempting to counter the sophisticated work of Zionist lobbyists. 
There was no Palestinian block to influence American politicians and no articles or 
books explaining the Palestinian point of view in the conflict.  
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By the end of WWII, the idea that Jews had the right to possess Palestine was 
deeply rooted in the minds of Americans, so deep that it became difficult to be 
refuted. Ever since Wilson’s endorsement of the Balfour Declaration, the 
commitment towards Zionism has never changed. The horrific events that took place 
in Europe during the Nazi regime and the spreading news about the holocaust and the 
persecution of Jews reinforced American sympathy with Zionism and deepened the 
notion that Jews had to have their own country to be safe. American Zionists were 
very organized in their campaign during this time. They used their well established 
connections with high level officials, congressmen, and their monopoly over the 
media to convince the American public of their case. Zionist action groups were 
organized with more than 400 local committees all over the U.S. The White House 
and State Department received a huge amount of letters from volunteers asking for 
American support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Millions of pamphlets were 
distributed along with books, articles and academic studies.36 
B. Role of Zionist Organizations: 
Between 1945 and 1948, Zionist organizations played a very important role in 
shaping American public opinion. They worked on projecting their program into the 
minds of Americans, ignoring the Palestinian perspective regarding their own future. 
Zionists did not only depend on Jewish organizations, they also made sure to have 
supporters from various Christian organizations. In 1946, the American Palestine 
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Committee, a Protestant group, was revitalized with secret Zionist funds. The aim of 
resorting to Christian organizations was to crystallize the sympathy of Christian 
Americans for the Zionist goal. The growth of Zionist influence was clear in a 
memorandum sent by Secretary of State Edward Stettinius to the newly elected 
president Harry Truman, warning him against the pressure he would get from the 
Zionists if he did not recognize the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.37  
One of the greatest examples of the way Zionists used literature and movies to 
influence American thoughts towards Palestinians was a novel that was widely read 
in the U.S.. The novel was titled Exodus and was published in 1958. This novel did 
not mention Palestinians, only Arabs. No special identity was given to the former. As 
Arabs, they were portrayed as lazy, violent, uncivilized, and religiously intolerant. 
The novel became a movie that witnessed the same success as the novel.38 Polls 
conducted on the eve of the 1948 war showed that Americans were unaware of the 
situation in the region. Only 20% thought that they had enough knowledge of the 
situation, and most supported the Israeli claims. Those 20% thought of the conflict as 
an Arab-Jewish conflict, without mentioning Palestinians as a distinct people.39 
Zionists gained preference inside the different American administrations 
largely due to the fact that new presidents mostly came to office with no previous 
knowledge of the conflict. They received their knowledge through their advisers and 
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bureaucrats. The presidents’ advisers, most of whom were pro-Israel, usually got 
more attention from the president than the bureaucrats, as they were mainly perceived 
as being overwhelmingly pro-Arab in their approach towards the region.40 
 
C. Role of Arab and Muslim Organizations: 
An important force in the U.S. that could have countered the Zionist 
monopoly in American policy making was the Muslim community. It was estimated 
that the number of American Muslims outnumbered American Jews. In spite of that, 
Muslim influence over American foreign policy making was marginal.41 Despite the 
fact that the Muslim community in America today is growing constantly, it still faces 
the same problems due to the fact that immigrant Muslims form the majority of the 
Muslim community in the U.S. In 1965, the Immigration Act opened the door for 
Muslim immigrants to come to the States, and most of them were well educated. In 
the 1950s, black Americans gave strength to this community. However, most Muslim 
Americans were perceived as radicals.  
One of the undermining factors that give preference to the Jewish lobby is the 
fact that American Jews usually act first as Jews and second as people of national 
origin. In contrast, Muslim Americans respond to four principle identities in 
themselves. First, they are attached to their national origin; second, they are attached 
to their racial origin, which is mostly important to Black Muslims who constitute 42 
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percent of the community; third, they try to influence policy as Muslims “per se”, 
which makes them work on a variety of issues; finally, they act like Americans, 
holding a variety of ideas concerning different aspects of policies just like other 
Americans from other religious groups.42 
The rise of the Palestinian Fedayeen in the 1960s did not only affect 
American politics towards Palestinians in Palestine or in refugee camps; it also 
affected Arab Americans and Arabs living in the U.S. Arab Americans were 
subjected to organized campaigns by a number of federal agencies. Motivated by 
security concerns, as a U.S. official claimed, the government became engaged in legal 
and illegal exercises designed to determine the amount of support given by domestic 
Arab organizations to Palestinian or pro-Palestinian organizations abroad. Such 
policies restricted the scattered and limited attempts made by Arab Americans to 
counter the influence of the Zionist lobby in the U.S.43 Due to such governmental 
actions and out of fear of Zionist extremists, many Arab Americans decided not to be 
outspoken about their ideas and beliefs about Middle East policies.44 
The long denial of the origin of the Palestinian problem, the overwhelming 
monopoly of the Jewish lobby over American policy making towards the Middle 
East, the negative perception Americans held towards Palestinians, and strategic 
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considerations concerning the Cold War were the most important factors that affected 
American policy making process towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
  
 
D. Wall of Defiance: 
After the fighting ceased in 1948, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, said 
that the U.S. was aware that the creation of the Israeli state “involved injustice to the 
Arab States”.45 Clearly Dulles’s statement showed that Palestinians were not involved 
in the American perception of the conflict. The ultimate concern of U.S. policy 
makers was Arab states, not Palestinians. For American policy makers, Palestinian 
refugees were a problem because they were seen as a disenchanted group with a 
potential for upsetting the status quo. Since the U.S. perceived it as a refugee 
problem, their approach towards Palestinians focused on refugee relief. This policy 
was an effort to provide tangible evidence of the American willingness to have 
friendship with Arabs. By providing Palestinians with relief, they thought they 
promoted regional stability but, instead, established and contained an important 
source of friction in the Arab-Israeli conflict.46 
As time passed by and Palestinians kept depending on Arab states as their 
political voice, the U.S. lost interest in the Palestinians, even as refugees. Palestinians 
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did not reemerge on the political agenda until late 1960s when they forced themselves 
into the world through armed struggle, which was and is still called terrorist activity. 
The armed struggle, especially the high-jacking of civilian airplanes, brought the 
Palestinian issue into the minds of people all over the world. 
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Chapter II 
From Nixon to Bush 
 
Frustrated by the failure of Pan Arabism to take any tangible actions in their 
favor, Palestinians concluded that they must take the lead in their conflict. After the 
1967 war, the Palestinian resistance movement became a significant factor in Middle 
Eastern politics.  
Before 1967, the U.S. was not interested in the activities conducted by the 
PLO. From the American perspective, as long as Israel saw PLO actions as no more 
than an irritant, there was no need for the U.S. to be concerned about the scattered 
news of its actions. However, by early 1967, raids by members of Fatah and other 
resistance groups pushed Israel to complain to the UN about Palestinian military 
actions.47 The outbreak of the 1967 war did not change the fundamental American 
perspective towards Palestinians. The war brought up another category of 
Palestinians, along with refugees, which was “civilians under occupation”. The U.S. 
also did not change its attitude despite the fact that international consensus had 
recognized the Palestinians as a separate people, deserving all the rights enjoyed by 
other peoples of the world. 48  
Although the PLO formulated its own political agenda, America failed to see 
this and still regarded the Palestinian problem as merely a refugee problem. At the 
same time, as Palestinians were becoming more politically active, the U.S. felt closer 
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to Israel, increasing the tendency to ignore Palestinian claims and rights. In the years 
after 1967, the PLO-American relationship was generally antagonistic, as well as 
complex and contradictory. Shocked by the Palestinian armed struggle and distrusting 
the PLO as a radicalizing influence in the Middle East, Washington never accepted 
the organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.49 
The American attitude towards the PLO as a nationalist movement was also 
derived from a long history of American support to Western states against similar 
movements. America supported France in its war against the Algerian movement, and 
Portugal against the liberation movements in Africa. It was, hence, logical to pursue 
the same policy towards the PLO.50 
Liberation movements using armed struggle against their occupiers were seen 
by the U.S. as terrorist organizations. The State Department defines terrorism as “the 
threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether 
acting for, or in opposition to, established government authority, when such actions 
are intended to shock, stun or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate 
victims”51   
The Palestinian image in this period was like a double-edged sword. Airline 
high-jackings and hostage-takings brought the Palestinian issue into the 
consciousness of Americans, making people understand that their problem was more 
than a refugee problem, but it gave at the same time a negative perception of 
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Palestinians. The Palestinians had been labeled as terrorists, aimed at the destruction 
of the only democratic Western-like state in the Middle East: Israel.  
A distinct factor in the American involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict was that it isolated itself from the international consensus on this issue. It 
created its own approach and kept it for decades. The international consensus was 
based on the exchange of territory for peace, which is based on UN resolutions 242 
and 338. The American approach did not ignore UN resolutions 242 and 338; the 
U.S. thought of them as a foundation for a reasonable settlement but also endorsed 
the concept of direct bilateral negotiations between states in a step-by-step process 
which would eventually lead to a comprehensive settlement. The concept of territory 
for peace remained unclear and seemed to allow Israel to keep some parts of the 
occupied territories.52 
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1. The  Nixon Era: 
Nixon was inaugurated as president in January 1969. Only days after he came 
to office, Nixon displayed his interest in the Middle East. He described the area as a 
“powder keg”, capable of leading to a confrontation between the two super powers. 
He promised to provide new initiatives and policies to bring peace to the region.53 
A. Policy Makers: 
Nixon appointed William Rogers as his Secretary of State and gave him 
considerable freedom in Middle East policy so that Nixon could concentrate more on 
East-West affairs and the Vietnam War. 54 Despite his intention, a prominent member 
in his administration fought his way into the Middle East affairs. Henry Kissinger, the 
National Security Adviser, became involved in Middle East policy making in 1971 
and soon gained the reputation of being the official who shaped the U.S. policy 
towards the Middle East in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, 
not only during Nixon’s tenure but also for many years after. As he told the Egyptian 
National Security Adviser Hafez Ismail in 1971, Nixon was against the involvement 
of Kissinger in the Middle East policy making process since he thought that being a 
Jew would affect Kissinger’s decisions, which would be disadvantageous in any 
Middle East negotiations.55  
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Within the Nixon administration there were two camps concerning the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The first one thought that peace in the Middle East was essential to 
U.S. interests and wanted to seek a comprehensive Arab-Israeli agreement. The other 
group, led by Kissinger, perceived the conflict in the context of superpower relations, 
which meant that the U.S. should dictate the policies in the region. The latter group 
thought that Israel was the best and only U.S. ally in the region, as Arab states were 
more affiliated with the Soviet Union.56 Both Nixon and Kissinger were globalists in 
thinking. They may have had differences on minor issues, but they were on the same 
side when it came to interpreting the Palestinian issue. They were interested in the 
way the conflict could affect the American Soviet relations and uninterested in the 
issues themselves that were involved.57      
Nixon was so unaware of the Palestinians that he mentioned them only twice 
in his memoires, referring to them only as guerrillas or extremists. Kissinger did not 
know much about Palestinians either, nor about the Arab-Israeli conflict, as he did 
not mention Palestinians in his memoires even once. Although Kissinger was not well 
informed about the conflict, he was a strong supporter of Israel. Those who worked 
with him tended to describe him as a friend or advisor to Israel more than a 
statesman.58 
Nixon’s perception of Palestinians as terrorists was crystallized very early in his 
career. Less than a month after he took office, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
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Palestine (PFLP) attacked an El Al airliner as it prepared to take off from Zurich. The 
new administration condemned the attack and began immediate consultations with 
other governments to seek international cooperation to halt future attacks. During 
Nixon’s tenure, the U.S. was a direct target outside of the Western hemisphere for the 
first time when, on 29th August 1969, the PFLP hijacked an American airliner. The 
PFLP attributed this attack to the American veto of a UN resolution that criticized 
Israel for violating the UN Charter, breaking the cease-fire resolutions of June 1967 
and the American delivery of Phantom jets to Israel.59 
It is worth mentioning that during Nixon’s years in the White House, the first 
major organized campaign against Arabs and Arab Americans was launched. During 
that period, it was noticed that Arabs started to disseminate information, especially on 
university campuses, to introduce the Arab and Palestinian perspective to Americans. 
Some officials believed that this was a great security concern; moreover, Zionists 
started to spread propaganda that Palestinian organizations, especially Fatah, were 
trying to seek help to start communications with radical American organizations, such 
the as the Black Panther Party, the Students for Democratic Society, and various 
communist parties.60  
B. Palestine within the Context of the Middle East: 
Unrest in the region was a disturbing factor to American officials because of 
the complex and interrelated nature of its problems. Palestinian armed resistance 
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brought back the dilemma of supporting Israel in its fight against Palestinians whilst 
preserving its interests in the Arab states. The U.S. believed that the growing number 
and power of Palestinian fedayeen in Jordan were a threat to its ally, the Hashemite 
Kingdom. In Lebanon, the presence of fedayeen was believed to halt any efforts to 
form an effective government. Another source of concern was the Soviets’ massive 
military sales to Arab regimes with nationalistic ideology, states that resisted 
American involvement in the region, such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq.61 
C. Palestine within the Context of the Cold War: 
As part of its détente policy, the Nixon administration made an attempt in its 
early months to coordinate Arab-Israeli policy with the Soviet Union. Frequent 
meetings were held between U.S. officials and Soviet counterparts to produce joint 
U.S.-Soviet principles for a peace agreement. The most important difficulty that faced 
Americans and Soviets, was Arab insistence on preconditioning Israeli withdrawal 
from the occupied territories of 1967 before conducting negotiations with Israel. At 
the same time, Israel insisted that a peace agreement should be a condition for 
withdrawal. The meetings led to a dead end, and the two parties were incapable of 
reaching any progress.62  
D. The Roger Plan: 
As a result, William Roger, then Secretary of State, decided to introduce his 
own ideas, which became known as the “Roger’s Plan”. The aim of the plan was to 
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achieve peace between Egypt and Israel from one side, and Jordan and Israel from the 
other. Palestinians were only mentioned as refugees, and nothing was mentioned 
about the right of self-determination. The Roger’s Plan did not make any progress 
due to Israeli rejection. 
Israel felt that the Roger’s Plan was against its interests and that the U.S. was 
sacrificing Israeli interests to improve its situation in the Cold War and to improve its 
relationships with Arab states. On the 22nd of December 1969, the Israeli ministerial 
council declared its refusal, using harsh language. At the very time when Roger was 
criticizing the langue used by the Israelis, the Soviets submitted a memo declaring 
their refusal of the plan.63 
The Administration was divided over the content of the plan. Nixon was 
afraid of the negative public reaction, which led him to meet with American-Jewish 
leaders, telling them that the plan did not have his full backing. Moreover, Kissinger 
actively opposed the plan. From his point of view, the plan was rewarding Egypt for 
its links with the Soviets and punishing Israel for being loyal to Washington. 
Kissinger was in favor of delaying any settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict to make 
sure that Arab states realized that the Soviet Union was incapable of securing an 
Israeli withdrawal and that only the U.S. was capable of doing so.64   
In the spring of 1970, Roger admitted that one of the four major mistakes that 
the U.S. had made in its approach to the Middle East was that they “assumed that the 
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Palestinians could be dealt with in a settlement purely as a refugee problem. Instead, 
they had become a quasi-independent force with veto power over policy in Jordan 
and perhaps even Lebanon.”65 
 
E. Black September: 
Despite the fact that the Roger plan neglected Palestinians, they had now 
forced themselves into the U.S. agenda. The U.S. was threatened by the fedayeen, 
especially in Jordan. The U.S. was afraid that the growing power of the fedayeen in 
Jordan would undermine the King’s ability to achieve peace, and worse they feared 
that he might be replaced by a radical government affiliated with the PLO, which was 
in turn seen as being an agent for Soviets. 
The events of Black September materialized American fears as they 
threatened a wide-spread unrest in the region. On September 16 and 1970, the 
Jordanian army engaged in heavy fighting with Palestinian fedayeen to undermine 
their presence and power within the Kingdom. The King of Jordan, afraid that Iraq 
and Syria may step in to help the PLO, asked the U.S. for help. The fighting started to 
escalate in a way tantamount to civil war. Syria sent its troops to Jordan and engaged 
in military actions against the Jordanian army.66 The United States did not interfere 
militarily in the conflict, though American troops in the Mediterranean were 
deployed. This deployment was not for military reasons, however, but rather a 
                                                 
65
 Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 253. 
66
 Christinson, Perceptions of Palestine, 128 
  
35 
political maneuver.67 The U.S. felt it was in a very uncomfortable situation as it was 
almost impossible to send American troops to Jordan. It was also aware that Jordan 
would not directly seek Israel’s help. 
The fighting ended in favor of King Hussein as the Syrian troops withdrew 
from Jordan without really escalating the conflict. The Palestinian fedayeen were 
defeated, leaving Jordan to settle in Lebanon for many years to come. The defeat of 
the Palestinians in that conflict was perceived as a victory over the Soviets as they 
refrained from taking any military actions after the U.S. threatened to intervene 
directly.68 
F. The 1973 War: 
The 1973 war marked a new stage in American involvement in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The war was a surprise and was interpreted as a confrontation 
between the two super powers, especially in terms of arms supplies. Despite that, the 
war did not change the American perspective concerning Palestinians.  
The same year brought a disaster to Nixon: the Watergate scandal. With 
Nixon caught up in that, Kissinger became more involved in formulating American 
policy towards the Middle East. As the Palestinian image was not very favorable in 
the minds of Americans, it was hard for policy makers to believe that Palestinians 
were willing to come to terms with Israel.  
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Kissinger rejected four proposals from the PLO after and during the 1973 war, 
indicating acceptance of Israel and willingness to participate in peace negotiations. 
Kissinger thought that the PLO was incapable of showing any kind of flexibility. He 
clearly indicated that, saying of the PLO that “even should it change its professed 
aims, it would not likely remain moderate for long.”69 
In response to one of PLO leader Yasser Arafat’s proposals, Kissinger sent 
the CIA deputy director to meet a close associate of Arafat in Rabat in November, 
1973. The meeting did not go anywhere in terms of bridging the gape between the 
PLO and America. For Kissinger, however, the meeting was successful because it 
achieved his goals, which were to gain time and to prevent any assaults during the 
early peace talks.70 
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2. The Ford Era: 
In August 1974, Nixon resigned and was succeeded by his vice president 
Gerald Ford. Ford had limited experience in the field of foreign policy making. He 
never thought he would be president and never worked for it. He was well known, 
however, for being close to Israel and being in favor of a strong defensive policy. 
Other than that, no one knew what he had in mind concerning the Middle East. 71   
A. Kissinger in Charge: 
Ford’s lack of experience kept Kissinger in charge of Middle East policy for 
some time, keeping his step-by-step tactic. The Ford years did not bring any change 
in American policies towards the Palestinians. Kissinger kept his policy of isolating 
Palestinians from any peace agreement as he noticed the growing power of the PLO 
in the world. In June 1975, in a meeting with American Jewish leaders, he clearly 
stated that he “left the Palestinian question alone in order to work on frontier 
questions hoping eventually to isolate Palestinians.”72 
B. U.S.-Israeli Secrete Pledge: 
A few weeks later, in September 1975, during the Sinai II Agreement and 
specifically in the Memorandum of Understanding called “U.S.-Israeli Assurance”, a 
secret pledge was added that would restrict any later administration in its quest for 
peace. In this secret agreement, the U.S. committed itself not to conduct any form of 
negotiations or direct official contacts with PLO officials until the latter recognized 
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Israel’s right to exist and accepted Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.73 
Although the statement prohibited negotiations, it was later understood as prohibiting 
negotiations and all kinds of communication. Israel insisted on issuing this MOU 
because it had become aware of the increasing recognition of Palestinians as a people 
all over the world.74  
Kissinger was successful in marginalizing the Palestinians and isolating them 
during the peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel. After the signing of the 
second peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, U.S. interest in the Middle East 
subsided and Kissinger became more involved in East-West relations.75  
C. Recognizing the Political Aspect of the Palestinian Issue: 
Ironically, and obviously because of Kissinger’s occupation with East-West relations 
in 1975, Harold Saunders, the then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs, was the first American policy maker to publicly announce that 
the Palestinian issue had a political aspect. Saunders stated that  
We have also repeatedly stated that the legitimate interests of the 
Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiation of 
Arab-Israeli peace. In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the 
problems arising from the partition of Palestine, the establishment of 
the State of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events, will not be 
possible until agreement is reached defining a just and permanent 
status of the Arab people who consider themselves as Palestinians…in 
addition to meeting the human needs and responding to legitimate 
personal claims of the refugees, there is another interest that mush be 
taken into account. It is a fact that many of the three million or so 
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people who call themselves Palestinians today increasingly regard 
themselves as having their own identity as a people and desire a voice 
in determining their political status. As with any people in this 
situation, there are differences among themselves, but the Palestinians 
collectively are a political factor which must be dealt with if there is to 
be a peace between Israel and its neighbors.76  
 
Saunders’ statement did not have any profound effect on American policy making. 
An important factor behind that was the timing of the speech. By late 1975, 
Washington was preparing for the 1976 presidential elections. Being caught in the 
middle of election rhetoric, the statement was forgotten. Moreover, it was reported 
later that Kissinger played a role in undermining and marginalizing the statement and 
its importance.77 
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3. The Carter Era: 
As soon as Jimmy Carter had reached office, his foreign policy making team 
started an assessment process of the possibility of a peace process in the Middle East 
and the importance of such a step for the U.S. They thought that the time was 
appropriate to conclude a comprehensive peace initiative in the Middle East, wherein 
the U.S. should play a primary role. 
Later they started to examine the priority level of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The memory of the 1975 war was still fresh in the American mind, along with its 
consequences. The oil embargo and its effect on the American economy, as well as 
the confrontation between the two powers during this war, made the new 
administration realize that to avoid such a war, peace would have to be achieved and 
it would have to be comprehensive. On the 4th of February 1977, the National 
Security Council recommended that Carter consider the Arab-Israeli conflict a high 
priority. President Carter approved the recommendation.78 
A. Policy Makers: 
Carter was surrounded by an idealist team in his administration, sharing the 
same vision of solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
shared his commitment to human rights. Before coming to the office of National 
Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski had supported inclusion of Palestinians in 
peace talks, and even the establishment of a Palestinian state. Unlike other presidents, 
who tended to be suspicious of bureaucracy and depend solely on their advisers in 
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forming foreign policy towards the Middle East in general and the Palestinian issue in 
particular, Carter depended on senior experts from the bureaucracy, such as Saunders 
and Quandt, as well as career ambassadors, in his policy making process.79 
B. Palestinians in the Mind of Carter: 
Carter was the first U.S. president to try to change the U.S. behavior towards 
Palestinians. He was able to overturn decades-old misconceptions about the 
Palestinian marginality, but he was ultimately defeated by the persistence of the old 
negative perceptions. Carter regarded Palestinians as the Blacks he had struggled for 
in battles against desegregation in the South. He was an idealist trying to make a 
difference in the world. He was the first American president to break the old 
established conventions, calling Palestinians by their names or using PLO 
interchangeably.80 He believed that the Palestinians should be involved in the 
negotiations, with the PLO as their representative. One of the essential points of the 
Carter administration’s concept of peace was that “Palestinians would have to 
participate in the formulation of peace. Overall peace must include the creation of a 
Palestinian political entity, or “homeland”, preferably in association with Jordan.”81 
C. Journey Towards Peace: 
In his first year in office, Carter was against the step-by-step policy taken by 
the previous administration. In an attempt to understand the Arab vision of peace, he 
sent Secretary of State Vance to the Middle East. This step also attempted to present 
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the American vision for peace, trying to build a bridge between the two sides. From 
the beginning, he faced obstacles that hindered his attempts. 
One obstacle was the commitment made previously by Kissinger not to 
negotiate with the PLO until it recognized the right of Israel to exist, UN resolutions 
242 and 338, and the Israeli position towards the PLO involvement in the Geneva 
peace conference. On his first trip, Vance did not meet any PLO officials, though he 
was optimistic because of the hints given by the PLO about compromise.82After his 
trip, Vance declared in a meeting of the National Security Council that all parties he 
negotiated with were willing to achieve a peace treaty. All of them agreed to go to 
Geneva in September and to discuses the essential issues before the negotiations 
commenced. 
Those issues were the nature of peace, the Israeli withdrawal, and the 
Palestinian issue. The most difficult issue facing Vance was the inclusion of a 
Palestinian delegation in the Geneva conference. Israel made it clear that there was no 
way it would accept the presence of a PLO delegation unless it declared its 
acceptance of UN resolution 242 and the right of Israel to exist.83   
After Vance’s trip, a sequence of meetings was held between Carter and the 
parties involved. Carter was hoping that the PLO would accept resolution 242, and 
Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia promised him to work with the PLO on this matter. Arab 
                                                 
82
 Tschirgi, 104. 
83Quandt, 185. 
  
43 
leaders, except President Hafez Assad of Syria, were willing to compromise for the 
sake of a peace treaty, which made Carter more enthusiastic and optimistic. 
D. Carter’s Vision: 
On March 16th Carter gave a speech in which he declared his vision of peace. 
In this speech, he stated that Palestinians should have a “homeland”. As soon as that 
word came out, reactions spread fast. He faced overwhelming criticism among 
Israel’s supporters for using such a term, while others asked him to specify the 
meaning of the word “homeland”. Arabs were happy hearing Carter using this word, 
and the PLO conveyed a message to the American administration through Russia, 
saying it was willing to accept Israel’s right to exist in exchange for Israel’s 
endorsement of a Palestinian “homeland”. Going a step farther, Carter called on Israel 
to accept this in return for PLO acceptance of its right to exist. The PLO asked the 
administration to define the boundaries of the envisaged Palestinian “homeland.”84   
E. The Hard Road towards Peace: 
The American enthusiasm of pursuing an Israeli-Palestinian agreement was 
undermined by events in Israel. On 21st of June 1977, Menachim Begin was elected 
Israeli prime minister. Although Carter was not enthusiastic about Begin’s election, 
in a meeting between Carter and Begin, attended by Vance, Begin did not seem 
reluctant to discuss vital issues with the American president. Begin was convinced 
that direct talks between Israel and the Arabs were the best way to achieve peace. The 
U.S. role was to be limited to getting the two parties together, leaving them to decide 
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the terms of peace. He thought that the Arabs depended heavily on America to 
pressure Israel. 
Unlike previous Israeli prime ministers, Begin thought that he did not need 
American consultation and that the U.S. should stop presenting peace plans. But it 
was too late for him, as the U.S. already had a plan. 
The U.S. administration came up with five principles that Carter presented to 
Begin. The first stressed the importance of having a comprehensive peace; the second 
declared that UN resolutions 242 and 338 had to be the base for any agreement; the 
third was related to the normalization of relations among parties; the fourth was 
related to the Israeli withdrawal, in stages, to the line it had held before the June 1967 
war, subject to border adjustment; and the final one was related to Palestinians and 
their right to be involved in deciding their own future. 
Begin had reservations on two points of the five. He did not agree that border 
adjustment should be minor. Secondly, he was against involving Palestinians in 
determining their own future.85 During these negotiations, Carter tried to convince 
Begin to moderate his plans of constructing more settlements, but he did not make 
any progress on this issue.86 
Facing the new Israeli government and its rigid mentality, as well as internal 
pressure, Carter tried to create a peace formula that could be accepted by all parties. 
Despite his sincere desire to involve Palestinians in peace talks, he was not willing to 
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pressure Israel to recognize the PLO. His fear of exerting any real pressure on Israel 
was clearly stated in a conversation that took place between him and the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister in 1977.  In that conversation, he asserted that exerting major 
pressure on Israel would be personal political suicide for him.87 
Failing to have a Palestinian recognition of resolutions 242 and 338, as well as 
the acceptance of Israel’s right to exist, made his mission impossible. On October 1st 
1977, the U.S. and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement on the Middle East. The 
statement did not mention resolution 242 and further declared that a settlement should 
ensure “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.” The joint statement was 
welcomed by the PLO, but was heavily denied by Israel and pro-Israel Americans. 
Trying to ease the tension caused by the joint statement, Carter issued a statement 
with Moshe Dayan and a “working paper” that included resolutions 242 and 338 as 
the bases for negotiations at Geneva. The working paper was negatively perceived by 
the Arab leaders, which put Carter in an uneasy situation. 
In November 1977, the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made his historic trip 
to Jerusalem as a sign of peace. This visit caused major frictions in the Arab world, 
though it was perceived as a brave move and a real step towards peace by the Carter 
administration.    
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F. The Aswan Formula:  
Carter’s new vision of peace contained three principles that he expressed in a 
speech delivered in Aswan on January 4th of 1978. Carter’s statement became known 
as the Aswan Formula. These principles were: 
- “First, true peace must be based on normal relations among the parties to 
the peace. Peace means more than just an end to belligerency. 
- Second, there must be withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied in 
1967 and agreement on secure and recognized borders for all parties in the 
context of normal and peaceful relations in accordance with UN 
Resolutions 242 and 338. 
- Third, there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its 
aspects. The problem must recognize the legitimate rights of all 
Palestinian people and enable Palestinians to participate in the 
determination of their own future.”88 
 
The wording of the statement showed that the U.S. gave up the concept of self-
determination in the Palestinian issue. As Seth Tillman puts it: “The Palestinian 
people were by this means put in notice that although they might ‘participate’ in 
deciding their own future, Israel and perhaps others would participate as well, 
guaranteeing that there would be no Palestinian state. The Wilsonian postulate was 
thus amended so as to retain most of its language while being divested of most of its 
meaning.” 89 At this stage, Carter seemed to be willing to undermine his approach to 
the Palestinian factor to promote peace between Egypt and Israel.  
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The agreement turned out to be a bilateral pact that Begin had sought all 
along. There was no serious plan on how autonomy would be achieved, and the 
words “self-determination” and “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by 
war” were not mentioned anywhere in the agreement.90 Noam Chomsky criticized 
Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David accord, saying that it did not open the 
door for a comprehensive peace. On the contrary, he believed, it completed 
Kissinger’s earlier efforts. The result of this accord was the continuation of the Israeli 
occupation of the territories, apart from Sinai.91  
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4. The  Reagan Era: 
As soon as Ronald Reagan came to office, his disagreement with Carter’s 
ideas towards Palestinians and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict were obvious. He 
criticized the Carter approach harshly, arguing that “no administration had ever 
deluded itself that Israel was not a permanent strategic interest to the United States.”92 
Reagan openly contradicted Carter on the settlement issue, declaring that he 
disagreed with the Carter administration when it referred to settlements as illegal. 
A. Policy Makers: 
His administration was filled with neo-conservatives, who were known for 
being pro-Israel, especially since he was very suspicious of the State Department’s 
Middle East officials. Even when George Shultz became Secretary of State, he was 
restrained by the short period he served and the heavy campaign launched against 
him by pro-Israel activists. Shultz was the only one inside Reagan’s administration 
showing interest in the Palestinian issue.93 Moreover, the Reagan administration 
established a very strong relationship with American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) which former congressman Paul Findley described as “of unprecedented 
intimacy”94  
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B. The Situation in the Middle East: 
When Reagan came to power in 1981, the situation in the Middle East was not 
an easy one. He had more than one challenge to deal with. On his inauguration day, 
the Iranian hostage crisis was over; in spite of that, American-Iranian relations were 
at a very critical and deteriorating stage. 
At the same time, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan threatened the pro-
Western Gulf regimes. The Arab world was divided; Egypt was under an Arab 
boycott because of its peace treaty with Israel. The Iraqi invasion of Iran was another 
source of Arab division. Moreover, Europe took advantage of the American 
preoccupation with elections and came closer to the PLO. During a summit in Italy in 
1980, Europe recognized the Palestinian right of self-determination and statehood, as 
well as improving the political status of the PLO.95  
Many who followed Reagan’s campaign thought that he came to office 
without a clear policy towards the Middle East, but time proved them wrong. The 
great threat to the Middle East was the Soviet Union. Reagan believed that protecting 
the oil-rich Persian Gulf was the primary goal. To achieve that goal, certain 
requirements had to be pursued; these requirements were that “priorities of U.S. 
interests in the Middle East must be made plainly evident; Arab regimes in the Gulf 
must be convinced of Washington’s active commitment to their security; available 
U.S. resources, both its own and those of proxies, should be visibly marshaled in 
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support of U.S. resolve; the firmness of U.S. opposition to “radicalism” throughout 
the area should not be doubted.”96  
The Reagan administration did not include the Arab-Israeli conflict in its 
priority agenda. It never perceived it as important in facing the Soviet threat in the 
region, which was its dominant concern at the time. Even when the conflict escalated 
after the Israeli bombing of a nuclear reactor and the bombing of a PLO complex in 
Beirut, causing the death of 300 civilians, the administration did not change its 
mentality.97  
C. Reagan and Israel: 
Reagan did not owe the Jewish community much for his election. His strong 
commitment towards Israel came from his belief in the strategic importance of Israel, 
especially in the face of the Soviet threat. Ever since he took office, officials talked 
about the special strategic importance of Israel and the help it could provide the U.S. 
within the region. Israel fit perfectly in the third category of the American 
requirements that Reagan and his team drew in regard to the Middle East. 
D. The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: 
The Reagan presidency witnessed two major events related to the Palestinian 
issue. The first was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the result of which was 
the expulsion of the Palestinian leadership from Lebanon. The PLO lost its 
battlefield, and, for the first time since its creation, it had to work from a distance. Its 
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new host country became Tunisia, a country far away from the Israeli borders. U.S. 
policy makers were well aware of the Israeli intentions from the beginning. In early 
September 1981, Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon discussed the possibility of the 
invasion with U.S. officials. In October, Begin told Secretary of State Alexander Haig 
that Israel might enter Lebanon to rearrange the situation there. By the end of the 
year, Sharon had told US ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis and former 
undersecretary of State Philip Habbib the Israeli plan. In early 1982, the director of 
Israeli military intelligence, General Saguy, informed Haig of the Israeli plans for a 
large-scale invasion of Lebanon. Moreover, Sharon talked to American officials 
about the invasion on the eve of the invasion.98  
Despite internal opposition in the U.S. to the Israeli invasion, especially the 
fact that Israel used U.S. weapons, the American attitude did not change. The 
ultimate fear the administration had was the outbreak of the war before Israel 
completed its withdrawal from the Sinai on the 25th of June according to the Israeli-
Egyptian peace treaty. Ever since the assassination of Sadat in October 1981, the U.S. 
had been trying to avoid anything that could have been used by Israel not to fulfill its 
obligation, because it feared that such a move would jeopardize the peace process and 
disturb the situation in the Middle East. General Saguy was told in his meeting that 
Israel should not make any move before its withdrawal from Sinai. The U.S. also 
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made sure that the PLO would not make any provocative move before that date in 
exchange for rewards that would improve their situation in any future settlement.99  
The American support of Israel in its war in Lebanon was motivated not only 
by the special relationship between Israel and the U.S., but also by the three 
American factors behind this support. First, Israeli aims in the war were not 
incompatible with American ones. Kissinger and Nixon thought that the PLO was a 
Soviet surrogate. Evacuating PLO forces from Lebanon was seen in the context of the 
Cold War. Once again, the U.S. was capable of marginalizing a Soviet client in the 
region. Second, the political map in Lebanon after the invasion was believed to be in 
favor of the U.S.. A pro-American regime would be installed in Lebanon. Third, the 
U.S. thought that defeating a radical force in the region would give moderate forces 
the chance to get closer to the U.S. while the U.S. got closer to Israel.100 
The American media coverage of the invasion became more hostile to Israel 
as time passed. Reagan felt the growth of internal pressure and started to make some 
measures to distance himself from Begin. The senior members of the World Zionist 
Congress went to Jerusalem to meet with the prime minister, telling him that the 
invasion was an embarrassment to the Jewish lobby in its relationship with the White 
House.101 
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E. The Aftermath of the Invasion: 
The end of the Lebanon crisis and the departure of PLO forces from Lebanon 
made Reagan think that the U.S. should formulate its policy towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict by adopting a two-track approach. Reagan thought that the U.S. should work 
on a settlement that would assure Israel’s legitimate security concerns and the 
Palestinians’ legitimate rights. 
Reagan was against both the establishment of a Palestinian state and Israeli 
permanent retention of the occupied territories. His favorite choice was the Jordanian 
option: “It is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the 
Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best 
chance for durable, just, and lasting peace.”102   
F. The Palestinian Intifada: 
The second important event was the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1987. The Palestinian uprising, or Intifada, brought the 
Palestinian issue into the homes of Americans through their television sets. For the 
first time, Israel was seen as an occupying power, fighting children with heavy arms. 
The American public became more aware of the Palestinian aspect of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The Palestinian uprising sparked the largest amount of polling on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The outcome of these polls 
showed that the American public 1) was closely divided over whether the Israeli 
reaction to the uprising was too harsh, 2) remained considerably more pro-Israel than 
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pro-Arab or pro-Palestinian in its sympathy, 3) was inclined to approve a Palestinian 
homeland as long as it did not threaten Israel’s security, and 4) supported an active 
American role in the Middle East.103   
In spite of the shock the Intifada brought the American public, the Reagan 
administration did not change its attitude towards Palestinians. Shultz himself thought 
that Israel had the right to restore order in the occupied territories. He differed, 
however, with the Israeli government on the level of oppression it was using against 
Palestinian civilians. This difference was due to Shultz’s awareness of the growing 
negative image of Israel amongst the American public. 
Richard Schifter, Shultz’s assistant secretary for human rights, told a 
congressional panel that “Israel clearly has not only the right, but the obligation, to 
preserve or restore order in the occupied territories and to use appropriate levels of 
force to accomplish that end.”104 The U.S. did support a UN resolution condemning 
the Israelis’ use of harsh measures, contrary to its previous behavior when the U.S. 
either vetoed or abstained from UN resolutions critical of Israel. Moreover, the 
Intifada made the Reagan administration think that it should do something to end the 
conflict. 
The widespread opposition in America of the Israeli actions and the Arab 
support of it made the U.S. fear that the conflict might escalate into a regional war. 
Moreover, after five years of political inactivity in the region, the U.S. feared that it 
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might lose its fifteen-year monopoly of the peace process. During all these years, the 
U.S. was not willing to hand Europe or the Soviet Union any important role in the 
peace process. 105 Shultz, traveled twice to the region, looking for new ideas and 
producing a package which became known as the Shultz Initiative: the first American 
initiative after the Reagan plan in 1982. 
G. The Shultz Initiative: 
The Shultz initiative was based on the idea of freezing all Israeli settlements 
and the ending the Intifada, given that negotiations would start in the same month 
(March 1988) to achieve Palestinian self-rule by February 1989. Shultz thought that 
once the Intifada was over, the PLO would not be able to gain its status as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Palestinians living in the occupied 
territories would have a major rule in determining their political future.106 
This was seen as a great opportunity, especially since the PLO was perceived 
as a terrorist organization and the U.S. was not willing to negotiate with it. Just like 
the Roger plan, the initiative excluded the option of an independent Palestinian state 
and favored the Jordanian option. Moreover, both of them were hindered by Israeli 
opposition. In both cases, the administration put some pressure on Israel to accept the 
American terms, but in both cases it did not push hard enough to jeopardize the 
Israeli-American relations. 
 
                                                 
105
 Ibid. P.10. 
106
 Heikal, 385. 
  
56 
H. Starting Political Dialogue with Palestinians: 
On 14 December 1988, the U.S. announced its decision to start a dialogue 
with the PLO. This sudden announcement was a by-product of two separate 
initiatives. The first was made by William Quandt in July 1988. This initiative 
involved a document outlining what the U.S. and the PLO should say in exchange for 
accepting the other’s conditions for starting the dialogue. The second one was taken 
by the Swedish government, with the aim of establishing an Israeli-PLO dialogue.107 
One of the reasons that led the U.S. to take such a step was the growing political 
influence of the PLO in Europe. In September 1988, Arafat was invited to give a 
major address on the Palestinian perspective on peace in front of the European 
Parliament. The speech he gave made European leaders, Margaret Thatcher among 
them, believe and they soon announced that Arafat’s statements made the PLO 
qualified to take part in the peace process.108 
Moreover, Arafat’s famous speech that took place in Geneva on December 
13, 1988, in which he renounced terrorism, made the U.S. willing to start a dialogue 
with the PLO. In his press conference, he stressed that conducting a dialogue with the 
PLO did not mean an American acceptance of a Palestinian State. The future of the 
West Bank and Gaza was to be determined in a process of negotiations.109 
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5. The Bush Era: 
When George Bush came to power in 1989, the situation in the world and the 
Middle East was different from the one Reagan faced. Internationally, the Cold War 
was over, the Iran-Iraq war had ended, and the American-PLO dialogue was in 
process. Bush was among the very few American presidents that came to office with 
a record on international affairs. But despite that, his views on the Middle East were 
not clear when he first came to office. However, he was generally perceived as a 
pragmatic politician.110 
A. Policy Makers: 
Most of the people, if not all, who worked with Bush in his policy making 
process towards the Middle East were deeply involved in this region. Before joining 
the Bush administration, they were involved in promoting American-Israeli relations 
from their positions within and outside the government. 
Donald Ross, who became the director of the State Department’s policy 
planning staff, and Richard Hass, director of Middle East affairs on the National 
Security Council, participated at a middle level of the State Department to promote 
strategic cooperation with Israel. Most of Bush’s personal advisers’ had religious and 
family ties with Israel, and some even lived there. Aaron David Miller, a policy 
planning staff analyst who was perceived as the most unbiased in the Bush 
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administration, said that he did not know where the line between professional and 
personal involvement in the peace process was drawn.111 
In early 1989, Yitzhak Rabin and Yitzhak Shamir were told that the new 
administration was ready to hear Israeli ideas about reviving the peace process. 
Shamir went to Washington, presenting a four point proposal. The most important 
point was conducting elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to form a negotiation 
team that did not consist of PLO members. At the time, Bush showed sympathy to 
Rabin’s proposal. 
Starting in mid 1989, the Bush administration worked on convincing the PLO 
not to include its members in the negotiation team. The main force behind this effort 
was the belief that the Israeli government was not willing to negotiate with the PLO. 
During that time, Palestinian-American relations started to witness some tension. The 
spreading of news reports concerning the meetings that were held between the 
American ambassador and Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) were one of the reasons behind 
this tension, as Abu Iyad was widely perceived as a terrorist by the U.S. The second 
factor was the hard line declaration issued by the Fatah movement. Palestinians 
believed that the meeting held between the PLO and the U.S. gave them a last 
warning that their delegation could not include any member from outside the 
occupied territories.112   
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B. Five-point Plan: 
In October 1989, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker presented his Five-Point 
Plan: 
1- The United States understands that because Egypt and Israel have been 
working hard on the peace process, there is agreement that an Israeli 
delegation should conduct a dialogue with a Palestinian delegation. 
2- The United States understands that Egypt cannot substitute itself for the 
Palestinian delegation and Egypt will consult with Palestinians on all aspects 
of that dialogue. Egypt will also consult with Israel and the United States. 
3- The United States understands that Israel will attend a dialogue only after a 
satisfactory list of Palestinians has been worked out. 
4- The United States understands that the Government of Israel will come to the 
dialogue on the basis of the Israeli Government’s May 14 Initiative. The 
United States further understands that Palestinians will come to the dialogue 
prepared to discuss elections and the negotiating process in accordance with 
Israel’s initiative. The U.S. understands, therefore, that the Palestinians would 
be free to raise issues that relate to their opinion on how to make elections and 
the negotiating process succeed. 
5- In order to facilitate this process, the U.S. proposes that the Foreign minister 
of Israel, Egypt and the U.S. meet in Washington within two weeks.113 
 
The Five-Point Plan turned out to be a failure, as Israel rejected it. The American 
criticism of Israeli policies concerning settlements and the continuous harsh language 
used by the administration gave the hard-line members of the Israeli cabinet the 
chance to undermine the American plan.114 
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C. Confronting Complications from the Israeli Side 
The Bush administration was alarmed on the 11th of July 1990, when Shamir 
formed a new government that excluded the Labor party. Shamir and most of his 
cabinet were in favor of annexing the West Bank, even though they did not say it in 
public. At the same time, Moscow relaxed its emigration restrictions over Soviet 
Jews, which caused a new wave of immigration into Israel.115 The Bush 
administration knew that it had a new challenge. It had to deal with a hard line 
government whose policies included the annexation of the West Bank, building 
settlements and recruiting new immigrants. 
On the 30th of May, a group from the Palestine Liberation Front attempted to 
attack a military target near Tel Aviv. The operation failed and no civilians were 
killed in this incident. Despite that, the Israeli government considered the operation as 
a violation of Arafat’s previous commitment and asked the U.S. to halt its talks with 
the PLO. The Bush administration asked Arafat to condemn the attack, but due to 
internal difficulties, Arafat did not adhere to the American request. Thus, on the 29th 
of June 1990, Washington decided to halt talks with the PLO.116 
On the 2nd of August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and started the second Gulf 
War. The U.S., heading an international coalition, launched a war against Iraq. 
During the time of the war, the Palestinian issue moved down on the American 
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priority agenda. Palestinian-American talks were not resumed until after the end of 
the war.117  
D. Bush’s Vision of Peace: 
In March 1991, Bush stated his vision of peace for the region in Congress. He 
said, “A comprehensive peace must be grounded in…Resolutions 242 and 338 and 
the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for 
Israel’s security and recognition, and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian 
political rights.”118 
The situation was ripe for the Bush administration to push for a peace 
conference. Bush was interested in conducting the peace conference soon after the 
war because of its disastrous effects on Iraq and its people. 
Moreover, he saw opportunities that should not be wasted. The opportunities 
derived from “the forceful assertion of unilateral U.S. power over the region, the 
demoralization of the Arab world,…the abdication of Europe, and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.”119 Arafat was weakened after the second Gulf War, and Israel was put 
under pressure by the Bush administration’s refusal to grant Israel a loan to 
accommodate the new Soviet immigrants and the continuous harsh American 
statements regarding settlements.120 
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E. Madrid Conference: 
The Palestinians finally agreed that the PLO would not attend the Madrid 
conference. A delegation of Palestinians, known for having ties to the PLO, was 
chosen by the PLO and was part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. To 
bypass the Israeli condition not to involve Palestinians from Jerusalem in the 
negotiation team, the Jordanian delegation included members whose families lived in 
Jerusalem. The PLO preserved its right to participate in any future peace talks.121 
The aim of the talks between Israel and the joint delegation was to reach an 
agreement within a year about arrangements for a five-year interim period of 
Palestinian self-government. In the third year, negotiations were to begin on a 
permanent status solution based on resolutions 242 and 338.122  
Despite the previous declaration Bush had made in Congress, the invitation to 
the conference referred to UN resolution 242, but it did not mention the principle of 
territory for peace. Moreover, the U.S. adhered to the Israeli demands not to have a 
unified Arab delegation and to limit the UN’s role in the conference. 
The conference took place on the 30th of October 1991. For the first time, 
Palestinians and Israelis would sit together in public around a negotiation table. The 
Palestinian delegation got the chance to work separately from the Jordanian 
delegation only in the third round of the talks. As the conference ended, a series of 
unilateral talks was expected to follow. The Arab states tried to convince Bush to 
                                                 
121
 Ibid, 310. 
122
 Heikal, 407. 
  
63 
intervene more in the coming negotiations, something he refused to do. He thought 
that the Arabs must adjust their positions towards Israel first. At the same time, Bush 
and his administration did not have a clear picture of how things were supposed to be 
solved.123  By the time Bush left the White House, nothing tangible had been 
achieved from the talks. It would take two more years before anything real would 
happen. 
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Chapter III 
The Clinton Era 
 
Despite the fact that Clinton did not orchestrate the peace process, he became 
the American president most involved in the peace process. Having his smiling face 
in the center of the historic picture that documented, until then, the unthinkable hand-
shake between the two arch-enemies, Arafat and Rabin, was not enough for him. On 
a personal level, Clinton felt that concluding a peace agreement between Palestinians 
and Israelis would place his name with the great leaders of the world. During his 
tenure, Clinton intervened personally when negotiations reached a dead end. 
Furthermore, Clinton was the first American president to welcome Arafat constantly 
to the White House, speaking of him positively as a peace partner, and was the first 
U.S. president to visit Palestinian land under Palestinian rule. 
All these formalities and his eagerness to reach a final agreement did not 
bring him closer than his predecessors to Palestinian aspirations. In many ways, 
Clinton caused more harm than good to the Palestinian people that may never be 
repaired. 
1. Middle East Policy Makers: 
The most influential policy makers working on the peace process in the 
Clinton administration were mostly known for their pro-Israel views. Criticizing 
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Israel harshly on some occasions made them believe that they were even-handed in 
their dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.124 
These officials were Martin Indyk, head of the Middle East desk at the 
National Security Council, Samual W Lewis, head of the State Department’s Policy 
Planning staff, and Dennis Ross, chief U.S. negotiator in the Arab-Israeli peace talks. 
These three “blended their personal and professional goals to such a degree” that 
Indyk said he could not think about life without the peace process. For him “life is the 
peace process.”125 
They believed that the way to achieve security for Israel was not through 
territorial expansion but by a deal with the Arab and that achieving such a deal should 
not be through pressuring Israel, but through convincing it to take baby steps, or an 
“instrumentalist” approach.126  
As for his two Secretaries of State, Warren Christopher and Madeline 
Albright, they were boxed in between a chief executive and a bureaucracy that shared 
the same biases favoring Israel. This should not be understood as if they were not 
pro-Israel themselves, because they were. Albright discovered her Jewish roots just 
after she came to office and was certainly pro-Israel.127  
The Vice President, Albert Gore, was no different than the others in the 
Clinton administration. Gore was a strong supporter of Israel. He was known to be a 
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close friend of Martin Peretz who influenced his views on the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. Moreover, as a Senator, Gore was well known for his extremist pro-Israel 
position.128 
2. General Policies: 
With an administration full of pro-Israel members, the Clinton administration 
proved to be one of the closest to Israel. The ultimate goal of the administration was 
reaching a peace agreement that served the security needs of Israel. The commitment 
of this administration towards Israel’s security was frequently outlined in the 
speeches presented by its members and by President Clinton himself. He reaffirmed 
the American commitment after the signing of the Wye Agreement, saying that “the 
United States will always stand with Israel, always remember that only a strong Israel 
can make peace. That is why we were, after all, your partner in security before we 
were partners for peace; our commitment to your security is ironclad – it will not ever 
change.”129 
Since 1993, the Clinton administration had advertised its role in the peace 
process as an honest mediator. This stand prevented the U.S. from supporting a 
position on substantive issues. This attitude was in favor of Israel. To hold to its 
position, the Clinton administration backed away from key positions that had featured 
in U.S. policy for decades and isolated itself entirely from international consensus 
regarding Palestine. First, it deserted UN resolution 242 as the base for negotiation. 
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Second, it accepted the Israeli notion that land captured in the 1967 war are disputed 
rather than occupied. Third, it openly allowed use of U.S. funds to finance Jewish 
settlements. Fourth, it worked on depriving Palestinian refugees from their 
internationally recognized legal status and right of return.  
In his first year in office, Clinton hinted that he was ready to abandon the 
previous American interpretation of resolution 242; the determination of the meaning 
of the resolution would be left to the parties themselves.130 As the parties held 
different interpretations of the meaning and as the Clinton administration was pro-
Israel, this was a catastrophe for the Palestinians. The administration’s willingness to 
desert resolution 242 was presented in the two draft papers on the Israeli-Palestinian 
Declaration of Principles submitted during the peace talks on the 14th of May and the 
30th of June 1993. In the drafts, the U.S. made no mention of the occupation, Israeli 
withdrawal, or the exchange of land for peace.131 The administration’s attempts to 
desert the resolution were not only restricted to making its components shallow, it 
also made sure to isolate it from other relevant UN resolutions that give meaning to 
242.132   
Furthermore, the U.S. changed its position on the ultimate disposition of the 
occupied West Bank and Gaza. In June 1993, Ross authored a statement of principles 
that left the sovereignty of the territories to be decided in final-status negotiations. 
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The Clinton administration started to use the term “disputed” rather than “occupied” 
territories when referring to the land taken by Israel in the 1967 war.  Moreover, his 
administration changed the concept of “full territory for full peace” to “some territory 
for full peace”. The concept of territorial compromise used by previous 
administrations implied full withdrawal by Israel in return for full peace from the 
Arabs. Under the Clinton administration, it meant territorial compromise by the 
Arabs in order to guarantee Israeli security. In short, the official approach could be 
characterized as autonomy without land, for security for Israel. 133 
In his 1992 campaign, Clinton rejected describing Jerusalem as occupied and 
took the position that the city’s final status should be resolved through 
negotiations.134 When Congress passed a law in 1995 regarding moving the American 
embassy to Jerusalem, Clinton pushed for a clause that would allow the president to 
determine the date of such a move. Clinton’s ultimate goal was not to prevent the 
movement of the embassy out of respect to the internationally recognized status of 
Jerusalem as occupied land, but because of his awareness that such a move at the 
wrong time would harm the peace process and even put an end to it.135 In a letter of 
assurance dated 24 October 1991 presented to the Palestinians, it was stated that “The 
United States is opposed to the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and the extension 
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of Israeli law on it and the extension of Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries…”136 
Clinton’s attitude towards Jerusalem showed that he was not only willing to ignore 
international consensus but also any promises he provided to Palestinians as soon as 
they were asymmetric with Israeli demands and wishes.   
On the issue of settlements, the Clinton administration went further than the 
Reagan administration in undermining their illegal status. The Clinton administration 
labeled them as merely “complicating factor,” and refused to debate Israeli 
construction of settlements in the UN on the grounds that it was “unproductive to 
debate the legalities of the issue.” Moreover, it openly allowed for the first time the 
use of U.S. funds to finance the growth of settlements in East Jerusalem and the rest 
of the occupied territories. 137  
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Edward 
Djerejian, testified before Congress on the 9th of March 1993 that the Clinton 
administration approved the use of the $10 billion in loans guaranteed to Israel in 
1992 to finance the “natural growth and basic, immediate needs” of existing 
settlements in the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem.138 Providing funds 
for Israeli settlements placed the U.S. in direct violation of UN Security Council 
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resolution 465 which, “calls upon all states not to provide Israel with any assistance 
to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territory.”139  
On the issue of refugees, the Clinton administration took a strategy that aimed 
at downgrading the refugees from the international status awarded to them through 
the UN to a strictly bilateral concern between Israel and the Palestinians. Trying to 
implement this approach, the administration made attempts to dissolve the UN Relief 
and Work Agency (UNRWA) and to transfer its responsibilities to the Palestinian 
Authority.140 While the administration offered $100 million to the PA, it cut by $17 
million the U.S. contributions to UNRWA. The administration voted against all 
General Assembly resolutions pertaining to the Palestinian refugees in 1993 and 1994 
on the grounds that they “pre-judge the outcome of the ongoing peace process and 
should be solved by direct negotiation.”141 
3. The Oslo Accord: 
Despite the fact that the Clinton administration was not a key partner in the 
making of the Oslo Accord, negotiations and their results reflected the U.S. 
orientation of what the Middle East peace should look like; stability rather than 
justice would be its key component.   The U.S. was happy about the peace process 
because it was hoping that it would provide stability to the region, which meant that 
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the U.S. would be able to pursue its interests. The sponsorship of Oslo also provided 
a great diplomatic and public relations boost to American policymakers. 142  
The administration became intensively involved in the peace process in its 
early stages. When news started to spread about the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 
Oslo, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres went to the White House to inform the 
Americans about the negotiations and their status. Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher was surprised by the scope of the accord and the method through which it 
was being achieved. Up till that moment, Christopher had thought that America had 
monopoly over the Middle East peace process.143 Ross was happy about the 
agreement, but at the same time he feared that such an agreement would “pump life” 
into the PLO, which he thought was fading away.144  
The Oslo Accord had two parts. The first was mutual recognition between 
Israel and the PLO, taking the form of two letters. The second part, the Declaration of 
Principles, set an agenda for negotiations on Palestinian self-government in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, beginning with Gaza and Jericho.145 The first part was a 
historical breakthrough and a major transformation of the relationship between the 
two parties. The second part of the accord, the Interim Agreement, was an agenda for 
negotiations, rather than a full agreement. 
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The accord was based on the notion that the problems between the two parties 
could be divided between easy ones and hard ones. The easy ones, to be negotiated 
over a five-year period, included: prisoners, the creation of the Palestinian Authority, 
economic assistance, and the creation of seaports and airports, among others. Oslo 
avoided nearly all the key issues, such as final borders, the future of Jerusalem, the 
status of refugees, sovereignty, and the military status of the Palestinian territories. 
These issues were supposed to be discussed after improving the level of confidence 
between the two parties.146 The nature of the accord caused a problem for the U.S. in 
dealing with the peace process since with the passage of time after the signing of the 
agreement, the internal politics of the two parties grew to be at odds. At the same 
time, the Oslo Accord failed to provide both sides with the security the peoples of the 
two sides thought they would get.147   
The first task the Clinton administration took was limiting opposition towards 
the Oslo agreement. Towards that end, Christopher called King Hussein of Jordan to 
guarantee his support for the agreement. When Asad of Syria started using fiery 
words while criticizing Arafat for accepting the peace agreement, he received a call 
from Christopher. The aim of it was to assure the Syrians that they would not be left 
out and to convince Asad to lower the tone of opposition in his speeches. Moreover, 
Christopher played the role of mediator between Arafat and Abu Lutof. The latter 
was against some aspects of the agreement and, because of that, his relationship with 
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Arafat was negatively affected. While in Washington to attend a UN General 
Assembly meeting in Washington, Abu Lutof was approached by Christopher. To the 
surprise of Christopher, Abu Lutof told him that he was willing to do whatever 
necessary to advance the agreement.148 
Another approach the Clinton administration adopted was financial aid. The 
administration believed that if Palestinians did not feel tangible changes on the 
ground, opposition towards the peace agreement could have reached a dangerous 
level. Before the signing ceremony, Clinton talked to Arafat and the Palestinian 
delegation about America’s strong commitment to providing economic support for 
the Palestinians. The same day, Christopher told Palestinian officials that the U.S. 
would contribute to aid efforts to make Palestinians feel the benefits of peace. The 
U.S. went even further by assuring that Palestinians would get aid not only from the 
U.S. but also from the international community. Two weeks after the signing of the 
Oslo agreement, the U.S. organized a multilateral donors’ conference for the 
Palestinians in Washington. Christopher declared that the aim of the conference was 
to mobilize “resources needed to make the agreement work.” More than $2 billion 
were pledged over five years. The U.S. contributed $500 million and was the largest 
single donor.149 
The first sign of bias and lack of interest in the Palestinian demands came 
during the tenth round of the Washington talks. As the Palestinian and Israeli 
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delegations were moving towards a dead end, the State Department presented a 
compromise paper at the end of June. The administration’s paper was a synthesis of 
ideas raised by the two delegations and the American coordinator. At this point, the 
administration shared the approach adopted by the previous one: the two parties 
should agree on a Declaration of Principles to guide negotiations with the aim of 
achieving the agreement in two phases. An analysis prepared by President Arafat 
showed that 65 per cent of the synthesis was taken from the Israeli paper, 28 percent 
from the American paper and only 7 per cent from the Palestinian paper.150 
 
4. The Hebron Massacre: 
The first major crisis the United States had to deal with was the Hebron 
massacre. On the 25th of February 1994, an Israeli militant entered the Ibrahimi 
mosque in Hebron and shot at praying Palestinians, murdering 30 people and 
wounding more than 70. Outrage throughout the occupied territories was widespread, 
especially after the leaking of the news confirming the involvement of Israeli soldiers 
in the massacre. 151 
The Hebron massacre presented a new shift within the American public 
towards the conflict. For the first time, Americans were exposed to the fact that 
Palestinians were not only terrorized by the Israeli army but also by fanatical settlers. 
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To associate the word “terrorist” with Jews had not been possible before the 
massacre. The Hebron massacre received widespread coverage in the American 
media for two full weeks. Despite this coverage, however, the American attention 
was shifted to another pro-Israel media event. This event was the launching of the 
famous film “Schindler’s List”. The movie got huge advertising and media 
coverage.152  Talking about the Nazi regime and the suffering of Jews during that 
period made people once again sympathize with Israelis and Jews, distracting their 
attention from the conditions Palestinians still lived under.  
Before the massacre, the U.S. was concentrating on the Syrian-Israeli peace 
process. The administration thought that the Syrian track was very crucial and of high 
priority after the signing of the peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis. 
U.S. officials had been thinking of sending Christopher to the Middle East at the end 
of March or early April to try to accelerate the Syrian-Israeli track. As a sign of 
protest against the Hebron massacre, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan suspended the 
ongoing peace talks held in Washington. The American interpretation of the 
suspension was that it was symbolic more than real. The talks were scheduled to 
recess just a couple of days away from the day they announced their suspension. A 
date had not been set for the next round of the talks.153 Being aware of the catastrophe 
that might occur if talks were not resumed, the U.S. decided to step in, trying to limit 
the damage. Despite the American condemnation of the massacre, the U.S. kept to its 
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policy of isolating itself from international consensus and remained the only country 
that did not perceive the massacre as a consequence of the Israeli settlement policy.154 
Immediately after the massacre took place, Clinton urged both Arafat and 
Rabin to leave their negotiation teams in Washington and accelerate their effort to 
reach an agreement on steps to implement Palestinian self-rule.155 For the first time, 
Clinton called Arafat personally to express his condolences and to urge him not to 
suspend negotiations. On the day of the massacre, Christopher called Arafat five 
times to secure an agreement to continue negotiations in Washington. Both of them 
urged Arafat to look at the massacre as an aggression directed towards the peace 
process, not the praying Muslims.156 Being subjected to extreme criticism from both 
the Palestinians and Arabs, Arafat decided not to adhere to the American request. The 
administration was aware of the pressure Arafat was exposed to, not only from 
Palestinians but also from the Arab world in general. “The intensity of Arab world 
reaction and prominence of the question of the protection of Palestinians make it very 
difficult for the Palestinian negotiators to just come back to the table,” testified 
Robert Pelletreau Jr., assistant secretary of state for Mideast affairs, before House of 
Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Europe and Middle East.157  However, this 
understanding did not change the American attitude towards the problem. The U.S. 
kept on putting pressure on Arafat to go on with the peace process. 
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Three main points of disagreement arose between the U.S. and the 
Palestinians during this crisis. The first and second were related to the UN resolution 
to be issued to condemn the massacre. The third one was on the timing of the 
resumption of peace talks. Attempts to issue a UN resolution condemning the 
massacre started on the same day of the occurrence of the shooting. The U.S. blocked 
the resolution. Christopher told Arafat on the 26th of February that a Security Council 
resolution would complicate matters. The U.S. perceived the resolution as part of the 
peace process, not something that stood by itself.158 The U.S. position towards the 
resolution was not surprising given the U.S. history with resolutions condemning 
Israel and the many letters of assurance given to Israel after the signing of the Oslo 
agreement about limiting the role of the UN.  
The first issue the U.S. opposed was a paragraph in the preamble that 
described the Security Council as “gravely concerned of the consequent Palestinian 
casualties in the occupied Palestinian territory as a result of the massacre, which 
underline the need to provide protection and security for the Palestinian people.”159 
Arafat insisted that the peacekeeping force to be deployed be of military nature, while 
the Israelis insisted that such a presence should mean civilian observers. The U.S. 
opposed Arafat’s demand, pointing out that UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina had 
been unsuccessful in maintaining peace and protecting Muslims.160 
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The second issue of disagreement on the UN resolution was over mentioning 
East Jerusalem in the resolution as occupied territory. The U.S. objected to the part 
saying that the Council was “reaffirming its relevant resolutions, which affirmed the 
application of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 to the territories 
occupied by Israel in June 1967, including Jerusalem, and the Israeli responsibilities 
there-under…”161  Consistent with its policy towards the disposition of the occupied 
territory, the U.S. refused such a claim, justifying its position by stating that the issue 
of Jerusalem was to be left to the final talks.  
The clauses that were supposed to describe Jerusalem as occupied were 
strongly opposed by the American Jewish community that intervened to make sure 
that the administration would not allow the passing of the resolution. The Jewish 
community was afraid that Clinton was ready to offer concessions to the Palestinians 
to assure the Palestinian approval to resume the peace talks. AIPAC’s President 
Steven Grossman visited Clinton at the White House and then reported to the 
members of his organization that he had warned Clinton about the emotional 
consequences in the American Jewish community if the U.S. were to allow the 
passage of the resolution. Grossman said that Clinton assured him that the American 
policy towards Jerusalem was “still right”.162 
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Arafat was annoyed that the Clinton administration was taking the Israeli side 
on this issue: “They’re supporting the Israeli point of view,” he said.163 In an unusual 
precedent, the U.S. insisted that the resolution be voted on paragraph by paragraph. 
This way the American delegation could abstain from voting on the paragraphs 
disputed. Christopher announced that if the Jerusalem reference had been made in the 
body of the resolution, rather than in the preamble, the U.S. would have vetoed it. 
Madeline Albright, then U.S. ambassador to the UN, said that the Clinton 
Administration allowed the resolution to pass “with great reluctance” because of the 
need to reactivate the peace process.164 
The last point of disagreement was about Arafat’s commitment to resuming 
peace talks. The Palestinians said that it was necessary to wait until the resolution 
was passed and the provisions concerning the peacekeeping force were actually 
implemented before the resumption of the peace talks. Moreover, without a strong 
UN resolution, it would be very likely that the people in Gaza and West Bank would 
turn against the peace process.  The Americans insisted that Arafat give his word to 
resume talks as soon as the resolution passed. 165  
On the 18th of March, the Security Council passed Resolution 904, 
condemning the massacre and calling for the presence of temporary international 
observers in the occupied territory. 160 observers, who were not part of a UN force, 
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were sent to Hebron. Most of them had been involved in various NGO-related work. 
Soon they were called “ice cream soldiers” because of their ineffectiveness and 
limited role.166  
Syria, Jordan and Lebanon agreed to resume the peace talks just after the 
signing of the agreement. On the next day, the Israeli state radio announced that 
Arafat and Rabin had spoken over the phone. Although there were further incidents 
reported in Gaza and the West Bank, peace talks were resumed on the 29th of March 
in Cairo.167 
 
5. The Hebron Agreement and the Tunnel Crisis: 
The Hebron agreement came about as a result of intensive efforts led by the 
U.S. to save the Oslo accord. The peace process was threatened after the assassination 
of Rabin and after the conclusion of the 1995 interim agreement known as Oslo II. 
The election of a new anti-Oslo Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, in 1996 
furthered the complications. The advent of Netanyahu did not only constitute a 
challenge and threat to the Palestinians, it was also a challenge to the Clinton 
administration due to several factors.  First, the Clinton administration was not in 
favor of the election of Netanyahu. It was outspoken about its desire to have Peres as 
the Israeli Prime Minister. The administration feared that its position during the 
Israeli elections would affect its relationship with the new Israeli government. 
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Netanyahu expressed his disappointment with the Clinton administration, believing it 
did not give him the respect he deserved as the Likud leader. In order to break the ice, 
Clinton called Netanyahu after the elections to congratulate him on a great campaign. 
Moreover, Ross invited Netanyahu to brief him on the status of negotiations. 
Netanyahu declined Ross’s invitation, saying that it was premature to meet U.S. 
officials before he formed his cabinet.168 
Second, Netanyahu was strongly supported by the American Congress. To 
make sure that Clinton understood this fact clearly, Netanyahu addressed the 
Congress during his first visit to Washington, giving a speech that stressed the 
similarities of Israeli and American values. His speech was very effective in 
strengthening his popularity inside the Congress.169 Clinton got the message and, 
being himself close to elections, decided to be careful in his dealing with the 
Palestinian issue, keeping his previous policy as a guideline for the future.  
Third, Netanyahu approached the elections with a strong anti-Oslo platform. 
He and his team were not willing or prepared to make the concessions to Palestinians 
required to achieve an agreement.170  In order to create facts on the ground in favor of 
Israel, Netanyahu started a series of provocative actions. Those actions increased the 
disappointment felt amongst the Palestinians with the Oslo agreement and the 
resulting situation on the ground that reached its peak during what came to be known 
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as the Tunnel Uprising. Consistent with his provocative policy, Netanyahu approved 
the opening of an old tunnel which ran alongside the Haram al-Sharif (Temple 
Mount) area. Believing that such an action affected the safety of the Haram, 
demonstrations erupted all over Palestine. These demonstrations escalated to direct 
clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli army. For the first time since the Oslo 
Agreement, Palestinian police joined the angry crowds, shooting at the Israeli 
army.171   
The Tunnel Crisis was a problem to the U.S. as it was hoping to maintain a 
peaceful political life in Palestine until the upcoming presidential elections were over. 
Clinton had two alternatives concerning how to deal with this shift in the Israeli 
government. He could have kept his previous policy of investing a great deal of time 
and effort keeping his position as a facilitator; or he could treat the peace process as a 
high priority issue and try to put pressure on both sides, especially the Israelis as the 
stronger party, to make concessions needed to conclude an agreement.172 
Clinton decided to merge the two alternatives. On the one hand, he considered 
the peace process to be a high priority issue. The Hebron agreement was a turning 
point in the American approach to the peace process. For the first time, the U.S. 
began playing a direct role, discussing details of the agreement and offering 
compromise suggestions. On the other hand, Clinton decided not to exert real 
pressure on Israel to accept any of the Palestinian demands. Exerting real pressure on 
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Israel would have affected Clinton’s position in the coming elections, keeping in 
mind the strong relationship and support Netanyahu had in Congress. 
Both parties were in favor of the new American approach. According to 
American officials, Netanyahu suggested that the U.S. be present at the negotiations. 
Netanyahu was in favor of having a more direct American role because of his fear 
that the collapse of the peace agreement would lead to the isolation or alienation of 
Israel. Moreover, it was better for Israel to make concessions to the U.S. than to 
Arafat himself.173 The Palestinians were hoping for the internationalization of the 
process, hoping that the international community would act as a guarantor for the 
agreements to be concluded. Arafat called on the Europeans and Russia to be 
involved along with the U.S., but his wish faced Israeli and American rejection. The 
Palestinians hoped that American involvement would increase their chances during 
the talks. Contrary to what they had hoped, American involvement turned out to be in 
favor of Israel, not the Palestinians.174 
To limit the political damage of the crisis, State Department officials worked 
around the clock to try to bring Netanyahu and Arafat together. They hoped that such 
a meeting would produce calm in the streets. Their efforts did not, however, produce 
the result they had hoped for. Netanyahu refused to listen to the American demand to 
close the tunnel; his main concern was his conservative domestic constituents. 
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Furthermore, he rebuffed American suggestions to send Ross or Christopher to the 
Middle East. Knowing that Netanyahu was not going to change his position, U.S. 
officials thought that bringing him and Arafat together would calm things down. The 
main idea behind that meeting was to get a “move on other issues that the 
Palestinians really want, like Hebron.”175 
In an attempt to get the two parties together, Clinton invited both Arafat and 
Netanyahu to Washington. In the Washington meeting, Clinton did not intervene in 
the negotiations between the two parties; he hosted a lunch in the White House and 
then left Arafat and Rabin along with King Hussein, who was in the States for 
medical treatment, to settle their problems.176 But the meeting in Washington did not 
lead to any concrete results. Netanyahu refused to give any concessions to the 
Palestinians. As expected, he refused to close the tunnel and turned down an 
American request to set a firm date to resume talks on the future of Jerusalem. On the 
issue of Hebron, with which U.S. officials were hoping to make progress, Clinton 
was unable to get Netanyahu to agree to a firm deadline of 60 days for concluding an 
agreement concerning Israeli redeployment in that city. Palestinians were so 
disappointed by the outcome of the meeting that President Arafat canceled a 
scheduled press conference and refused to say a word to the press. At this point, the 
Clinton administration lost hope of reaching an agreement on Hebron before the 
                                                 
175
 Steven Erlanger, “Limits on U.S. Leverage: The Need of Both Sides,” New York Times, Sep. 28, 
1996. 
176
 Quandt, 343. 
  
85 
presidential elections. Despite that fact, Clinton thought that getting both leaders 
together was a success in itself.177 
The initial round of negotiations started in Taba, Egypt during the first week 
of October. Netanyahu acknowledged the fact that certain elements of the Oslo 
accord were irreversible; therefore, he presented himself to the Israeli and American 
public as ready to pursue the peace process. For example, he did not want to reoccupy 
the West Bank and Gaza, but he remained committed to keeping as much land as 
possible and giving Palestinians a territory that lacked geographical contiguity.178 
Negotiations took place in the presence of Ross and his deputy Aaron Miller. During 
these negotiations Americans started to use a more direct and active role.179 The U.S. 
reaffirmed its commitment towards Israeli security; in fact, both Israel and the U.S. 
reaffirmed the primacy of Israeli security. They both agreed that the security 
arrangement in Hebron should not be short term; rather they were looking for an 
agreement that would prevent friction between settlers and Palestinians in the long 
term. The U.S. supported the Palestinians demand of linking the Hebron 
redeployment and the unfulfilled interim arrangements, especially the opening of the 
Gaza airport and seaport, and safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank. The 
American support came mainly out of its eagerness to conclude an agreement before 
the presidential elections and partly because of the North Africa and Middle East 
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Economic Summit scheduled for November. The U.S. was hoping that reaching an 
agreement would increase the opportunity for Israel to achieve economic benefits 
from the summit and promote normalization between the Arab states and Israel.180 
The Hebron agreement was finally concluded on the 15th of January 1997. The 
Hebron protocol did not constitute a new agreement but rather the steps required to 
implement part of an agreement, “The Guidelines on Redeployment in Hebron,” 
annexed to the Interim Agreement. Hebron was left to be the last city in the West 
Bank for the Israeli redeployment to work on security issues arising from the 
presence of 450 militant Israeli settlers in the city’s center.181  
In documents accompanying the Hebron accord, the U.S. assured Israel that 
the key element in the U.S. approach to peace “has always been recognition of 
Israeli’s security requirements.” These security requirements were to be identified by 
Israel. Moreover, those documents showed that the U.S. approved of any Israeli 
withdrawals to be decided by Israel alone and not in negotiation with the 
Palestinians.182 
One of the papers included in the agreement was a “Note for the Record” that 
was written by Ross. The essence of this note stated that Israel was still committed to 
Oslo II “on the basis of reciprocity.” The Israeli interpretation of the concept 
“reciprocity” intended to delay any further redeployment and put pressure on the 
Palestinians. Netanyahu used the term to push the Palestinians to take certain steps as 
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a precondition to any future Israeli steps. This way, he thought the breakdown of 
peace talks would be blamed on the Palestinians.183 Using the same term as Ross 
clearly illustrated the American continuous consent to the Israeli approach and 
interpretations throughout the peace process. 
In this letter, Ross delineated Israel’s responsibilities under Oslo II: 
-Further redeployment of Israeli forces from parts of Zones B and C 
would begin during the first week of March 1997. 
-Prisoner release issues would be dealt with according to the provisions 
of Oslo II. 
-Negotiations would be resumed on a variety of outstanding issues, 
including safe passage from Gaza to the West Bank, and airport and 
seaport for Gaza, and a basket of economic and security issues. 
-The negotiations on final status, which would resume “within two 
months, in other words, sometime in March 1997.184 
 
Ross’s “Note for the Record” and Christopher’s “Letter of Assurance” were very 
much in favor of Israel’s interests. Those accompanying letters gave Israel the chance 
to undermine the essence of the “linkage” of issues which the Palestinians were 
hoping to gain from. For example, in the “Note for the Record” under “Palestinian 
Responsibilities,” it was stated that the “size of Palestinian Police will be pursuant to 
the Interim Agreement.” This allowed Israel to force the Palestinians to cut back the 
numbers of their police forces, which the Labor government had allowed to be 
expanded.185 
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6. The Road to a New Agreement: 
Having been reelected, Clinton wanted to leave office with an outstanding 
personal victory. It is generally believed that presidents in their second term are more 
free to exert policies that they would not have thought about during their first term. 
But this was not the case with Clinton’s second term. His reluctance to achieve 
permanent peace between Palestinians and Israelis was still hindered by his inability 
and unwillingness to exert real pressure on Israel. In the case of the peace process, an 
important phenomenon affected his flexibility, which is called “a lame duck 
presidency”. Usually during the second half of a president’s second term, foreign 
presidents start to focus on who will be the successor. Trying to envision that makes 
them less reluctant to compromise, hoping that the next president will bring with him 
a better deal.186 Moreover, Clinton faced the possibility of impeachment just after his 
reelection as a consequence of a sexual scandal, publicly known as “Monica Gate”, 
involving a young White House intern named Monica Lewinsky. The situation in the 
Middle East did not favor his efforts either. During the first months of his second 
term, Syria started to build ties with Saddam Hussein, and American pressure to 
contain Iraq, Libya, and Iran was being resisted by usually friendly Arab regimes.187 
The conclusion of the Hebron Accord did not put an end to the American 
troubles in the region. Still American officials had a long way to go. Just one month 
after the signing of the agreement, hopes of peace started to fade away. A few weeks 
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after his inauguration, Clinton held a meeting with Netanyahu, trying to convince him 
to take further steps in the Oslo process. Being criticized by some members of his 
party for giving up land to Palestinians and unwilling to go any further, Netanyahu 
started to put more obstacles in the way.188  
In March 1997, Netanyahu gave his approval to build a new settlement in East 
Jerusalem. The new settlement was built on a mountain named by Palestinians as 
Jabal Abu Ghunyam. This land overlooking Bethlehem was mainly owned by 
Palestinians. The purpose behind building a settlement on this land was to close a 
ring of settlements around Jerusalem. This way “the last gateway to a prospective 
Arab capital would be blocked.”189 As part of its continuous policy towards 
undermining the role of the UN and supporting the Israeli settlement policy, the U.S. 
vetoed a UN resolution condemning the building of the settlement. The American 
argument at that time was that it was inappropriate for the UN to get involved in an 
issue that was supposed to be settled between the two parties themselves. The 
administration thought that the Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty made previous 
resolutions “obsolete and anachronistic.”190 The language used in the resolution was 
much simpler than that used in previous resolutions vetoed by the U.S.. The 
resolution did not go any further than demanding that Israel “immediately cease 
construction of the Jabal Abu Ghneim settlement in East Jerusalem as well as all 
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other Israeli settlement activities in the occupied territories.”191 To make things 
worse, on the 14th of September, the planning commission of the Jerusalem district 
approved the construction of a Jewish settlement in the Palestinian quarter of the old 
city, Ras el-Amud.192 At this point, the peace process came to a halt. From his side, 
Arafat suspended talks with Netanyahu and diminished the security cooperation 
between the Palestinian police and the Israeli army. 
In early August 1997, the new Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, decided 
to break the silence towards the Middle East and get involved in the peace process to 
try to end the deadlock. Albright did not offer any American views of substance but 
suggested an active mediating role for America. Trying to address Palestinian 
concerns, she spoke of accelerating talks on interim issues. To satisfy the Israelis, she 
talked about moving fast into the issues of a final settlement. Albright made several 
trips to the Middle East, meeting both Arafat and Netanyahu, trying to break the ice 
between the two parties; her efforts did not, however, reach any viable results. 193 
Addressing Palestinian concerns did not mean that Albright was capable of 
understanding the realities under which Palestinians lived. As a matter of fact, she 
thought that Arafat had limited security cooperation and halted peace talks to 
politically blackmail Netanyahu. She was incapable of seeing the despair.194 
                                                 
191Paul Lewis, “U.S. Again Vetoes a Move By UN Condemning Israel,” New York Times, March 22, 
1997. 
192
 Charles Enderlin, Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-
2002. Trans. Susan Sairfield. (New York: Other Press, 2003): 72. 
193
 Quant, 350. 
194
 Hoagland. 
  
91 
On the 20th of January 1998, Clinton held a meeting with Netanyahu. Before 
meeting with Clinton, Netanyahu was informed by the pro-Israel leader of the 
Republican opposition and Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich 
and Jerry Fallwell, a far-right preacher, about the scandal the president was involved 
in and he was also notified that the president was going to be preoccupied by the 
public scandal. Knowing that, Netanyahu decided to resist any American demands 
and to stress his own.195 Netanyahu was expected to bring a plan that included Israeli 
withdrawal from 10 percent of the West Bank; however, he wanted to have five 
months before the Israeli Cabinet would vote on the Israeli withdrawal. During that 
period, Palestinian actions concerning Israeli security and the halting of anti-Israeli 
rhetoric would be tested. If the Cabinet thought that the Palestinians had met Israel’s 
demands, the Cabinet would approve the withdrawal plan; if not, it would veto it.196 
Clinton also held a meeting with Arafat, but the meeting was not successful at all, as 
he was so occupied with the “Monica Gate” scandal that he was not capable of 
conducting the meeting in a proper way. This was evidenced by the fact that Clinton 
kept leaving the meeting every now and then, and his mind clearly was not focused 
on the peace process.197 During Arafat’s visit, Arafat informed the Americans that the 
Israeli proposal of withdrawing from 10 percent of the West Bank was insufficient. 
Moreover, he said that the Palestinian side insisted that Israel perform three 
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withdrawals, not one as they proposed, and that the Palestinians should be consulted 
about any future withdrawals Israel intended to perform.198 Despite that, Clinton 
presented a detailed American plan in March which talked about improving the 
Palestinian performance on security and the Israeli withdrawal. The U.S. suggested 
that Israel would be expected to withdraw from an additional 13.1 percent of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including territories in both zones C and B.199 When 
the two parties were ready to talk about the issue, the U.S. asked Netanyahu to refrain 
from mentioning the exact percentage before meeting with Arafat in Clinton’s 
presence. They knew that announcing the percentage would lead to immediate 
rejection by Arafat and would delay or cancel a future agreement.200 
Albright held meetings with Arafat and Netanyahu in London in May. She 
was capable of gaining Arafat’s approval to the American peace plan, but Netanyahu 
did not grant her his approval. As a result, Albright decided to pressure the Israelis to 
approve the proposal. In a press conference on 5 May 1998, she announced that she 
wanted the Israeli response to the proposal by the 11th of May. Albright threatened 
that if Netanyahu rejected the American proposal, she would publicize the American 
disagreements with the Israeli Prime Minster and that the U.S. would “reexamine our 
approach to the Middle East peace process.”201 This harsh attitude towards Israel did 
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not last longer than two weeks. Albright soon changed her hostile attitude to a 
friendly one, affirming that the U.S. could never dictate that Israel does anything and 
that only Israel should be in charge of its security. At first the deadline was extended, 
then removed altogether. Later, the administration announced that it was not against 
the Israeli opposition to the plan. In her next visit to London, Albright exerted 
pressure on the Palestinians.  
Internal concerns were mainly behind that shift in attitude. The Clinton 
administration was facing scandals that threatened and weakened Clinton’s position 
and ability to concentrate on foreign policy. By the time the Monica Lewinsky story 
began to emerge in public, some members of the pro-Israel community were already 
debating whether a possible resignation of Clinton would be good for them and Israel. 
The Jewish lobby started a heavy campaign against Clinton and his administration as 
soon as they heard Albright’s words. Clinton was accused of selling Israel for the 
sake of Arafat and other Arab countries. Congress launched a heavy campaign along 
with the pro-Israel lobby against both Clinton and Albright. A letter was sent to the 
president, signed by the majority of the House, saying that Israel should not accept 
the White House’s counterproductive plan. Making things worse for the 
administration was the statement made by Hillary Clinton one day before Albright’s 
London press conference. Mrs. Clinton declared that the establishment of a 
Palestinian state would be “very important for the broader goal of peace in the Middle 
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East.” Her statement was interpreted as part of a strategy by Clinton to push Israel to 
go on with the peace process.202 
American efforts continued throughout the summer. During that summer, the 
U.S. focused on closing the gap between Palestinians and Israelis. To do so, the U.S. 
linked the Palestinian demand of Israeli withdrawal from 13 percent of the West 
Bank to the Israeli demand of combating so-called Palestinian “terrorism”.203 As talks 
were not going anywhere, Arafat started in July to declare that if an agreement was 
not reached, he would unilaterally declare a Palestinian State on the 4th of May 1999. 
Arafat justified his position of declaring a Palestinian State on that day as it marked 
the end of the five-year transitional period stipulated in the Oslo accords.204 To make 
things worse for the Americans, a UN General Assembly resolution was passed, 
upgrading the status of Palestinians in the United Nations. This resolution was 
strongly condemned by the U.S. at all levels, State Department, Congress and the 
White House. James Rubin, the States Department’s spokesman, said that such a 
resolution would lead Israel to take unilateral actions. Rubin said that the resolution 
was unnecessary and untimely.205 
On the 28th of September, Albright met Arafat and Netanyahu as a sidebar to a 
session of the UN General Assembly. The meeting did not lead to any development. 
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In another meeting at the White House, Netanyahu insisted that he was going to 
accept the concept of 13 percent withdrawal from the West Bank only after a security 
agreement was concluded. Moreover, Netanyahu agreed on the 13 percent only on the 
condition that 3 percent of that area would be a “nature reserve” on which 
Palestinians could not build. 206 
7. The Wye Agreement: 
While Clinton was facing the possibility of impeachment and the electoral 
campaign for Congress was going on, Clinton and Albright decided to hold a summit 
in which an agreement would be reached and signed by the two parties. Due to 
“Monica Gate”, Clinton faced a problem of credibility from the Palestinian side. Ziad 
Amer, a Palestinian lawmaker, stated, “Before the scandal, at least [Clinton] had 
some credibility. He could send an envoy or Secretary of State and people would take 
it seriously. I don’t think he can be taken seriously. He also has no ability to do 
anything about the peace process. It is not even a realistic option.”207 Another 
disadvantage Clinton faced was that both Arafat and Netanyahu were aware of the 
fact that he was more reluctant to achieve a result during these negotiations than they 
were and that both of them were willing to use this fact to their advantage.208 
Publicly, Clinton was in better condition since public opinion polls surprisingly 
showed that most Americans blamed Congress and the special prosecutor for 
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exaggerating the Monica Lewinsky scandal and using it for political purposes against 
Clinton.209 
On the 15th of October, Netanyahu and Arafat landed in Washington, and after 
a short ceremony in the White House, they were both taken to the Wye Plantation. 
Clinton and his team wanted to make sure that Netanyahu would not have time to 
visit his friends in Congress as he usually did.210 Moreover, the media was not 
allowed to cover the details of the negotiations. As the Washington Post put it, the 
administration did not want participants to negotiate “through the news media”.211  
At the heart of the negotiations was the Palestinian security plan. George Tenet, 
director of the CIA, headed most security discussions. The Wye negotiations 
consolidated one key aspect of U.S. involvement in the conflict:  the centrality of the 
CIA as Washington’s key instrument in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.212 The 
involvement of the CIA was consistent with the American commitment to Israeli 
security that guided the administration’s efforts to resolve the conflict throughout the 
previous and upcoming agreements.   
The first major crisis that faced the summit was the Israeli insistence on 
receiving a detailed written Palestinian security plan, something the Palestinians 
refused to submit. As a consequence, Netanyahu threatened to leave the Wye 
Plantation, suspending peace talks. To calm things down, the Americans told the 
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Israelis that the plan existed and that they would be receiving it the following day. 
Chairing the security meeting, Tenet was capable of bypassing the crisis, but the next 
day brought another crisis: a Palestinian carried out a grenade attack in Beersheva, 
wounding sixty-four Israelis. Netanyahu suspended all talks except on security. 
Trying to save the summit, Clinton came back to Wye, canceling his appearance for a 
fundraising campaign. The incident did not have real effect on the summit as the 
attacker was found to be working individually. On the 20th of October, King Hussein 
joined the negotiation teams.213 At this point, Clinton called for an “inventory” of all 
issues. Addressing Ross, he said, “Let’s see if there’s groups of issues that we can 
settle now and then reserve the harder issues for later.” According to Ross, Clinton’s 
instructions were fruitful and helped in keeping negotiations going.214 The very next 
day, Aviv Bushinsky, Netanyahu’s spokesman, announced that “since there is no 
Palestinian security plan, the prime minister is leaving the conference.” Half an hour 
after that announcement, Rubin stated in a press conference that “in the security area, 
we think serious work has been done and we think there is a sufficient basis to 
proceed, and it would be very unfortunate if one or the other party were to leave 
while we are ready, willing and able to help provide security for their people.”215 
Clinton decided to cancel his return to the conference. Albright went to see 
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Netanyahu, telling him that he was free to leave. In the evening, Netanyahu decided 
to stay although his maneuver did not give him the results he was hoping for.216 
On the 22nd of October, Clinton returned to the Wye Plantation determined 
this time to reach an agreement. Twenty-one hours later, an agreement was reached. 
The last crisis that might have canceled the signing of the agreement was due to a 
political maneuver Netanyahu made at the last minute. Netanyahu claimed that 
Clinton had promised him to release Jonathan Pollard, an American found guilty of 
spying for Israel. U.S. officials denied Netanyahu’s claim, and under heavy pressure 
from the U.S. intelligence community, Clinton said that Pollard was not going to be 
released, but he promised to initiate a review of his case.217 Netanyahu’s maneuver 
had backfired. He was not only incapable of releasing Pollard, but he also damaged 
his strong relations with the Republicans.218 On the 23rd of October 1998, the 
agreement was signed by Arafat and Netanyahu.  
As he had expected, the conclusion of the Wye agreement benefited Clinton 
himself. First, he was capable of demonstrating to Americans and the rest of the 
world that despite the problems he was facing, he was still a leader with international 
influence. Second, he was capable of removing Arab and Palestinian pessimism 
concerning his ability to exert pressure on Israel and to limit the damage caused by 
the American attacks on Iraq. Third, his position vis-à-vis Netanyahu was 
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strengthened due to the deteriorating relations between Netanyahu and Congress.219 
The signing of the agreement was seen as a victory achieved by the “indispensable 
man”, Clinton. He was portrayed in the news as the man who “preached 
accommodation to immutable realities.”220 
8. Clinton in Gaza: 
Clinton was aware that his victory at the Wye Plantation did not put an end to 
the conflict; the peace process was not over yet. As part of the Wye agreement, 
Clinton promised Arafat to visit Gaza to witness the meeting of the Palestinian 
National Council, in which the PA would null all clauses in the Palestinian Charter 
calling for the destruction of Israel.221 Ironically, the most pro-Israel American 
president would be the first American president to make an official visit to a 
Palestinian controlled territory.  
The situation on the ground was not what Clinton hoped for. In the American 
arena, Clinton was planning for a new assault on Iraq. The impeachment process was 
at its height, and Clinton was worried since many senators, even Democrats, did not 
reveal their position on the matter. Clinton’s aides saw the situation in Congress as 
“not positive for Clinton”. A senior aide told Clinton, “You’ve got guys that we 
thought we could get that have come out against us”222 
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The situation in Palestine was also tense. Netanyahu, after performing a very 
modest redeployment and releasing some prisoners, announced the freezing of the 
implementation of the Wye Agreement. For him, Arafat had not fulfilled his part of 
the deal satisfactorily. Before the visit, many Israeli ministers suggested that Clinton 
should postpone his visit since visiting the Palestinian territory at this point would 
seem to be a great conciliation to Arafat.  
Netanyahu announced that the implementation of the agreement on the Israeli part 
would remain halted until Palestinians fulfilled five demands: 
1- Give up the unilateral proclamation of the Palestinian State; 
2- Give up the demand for the release of Palestinian prisoners guilty of 
violent crimes; 
3- Mount an operation, under American control, to seize illegal weapons; 
4- Furnish a list of Palestinian police. Cut this police force back to 30,000 
men; 
5- Furnish the first report of the commission against incitement to 
violence.223 
 
Palestinian streets were filled with demonstrations organized by the families of the 
political prisoners in Israel. Disappointed by the outcome of the agreement, some 
Palestinians believed that despite the symbolic importance of Clinton’s visit, he was 
not going to offer Palestinians anything tangible. The popular Palestinian newspaper 
Al-Quds commented on the visit, saying, “After Clinton’s [helicopter] lands at the 
Gaza airport, and after we blink our eyes in astonishment between believing and 
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disbelieving, we will ask the president if his visit is the beginning of a new era 
following decades of U.S. alignment with Israeli aggression.”224  
Despite all these tensions, Clinton decided to take the trip to Gaza. He was 
warmly welcomed, then witnessed the meeting of the Palestinian National Council 
and declared, hand in hand with Arafat, the opening of Gaza International Airport.  
9. Sharm El-Sheikh: 
Two events occupied Clinton after coming back from his historic trip to Gaza 
and the West Bank. The first one was the Israeli elections, which he hoped would 
bring a more moderate Israeli Prime Minister; the second was the approaching date of 
Arafat’s promise to declare a Palestinian state. Being uncertain about the real 
Palestinian intentions and fearing that such a declaration would result in a 
confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians that might help Netanyahu in the 
upcoming elections, Clinton sent a letter to Arafat on the 26th of April.225  The letter 
represented a clear example of the continuous American policy towards Palestinians. 
Throughout the peace process, the U.S. kept asking Palestinians to fulfill their part of 
the agreements, even though Israel never fulfilled its part. The letter said, in part: 
“The first phase was implemented. Unfortunately, the second and third phases have 
not been. The Palestinians have implemented many of their commitments for the 
second phase….It is important that you continue these efforts and fulfill all of your 
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commitments. We will continue to work actively for implementation by Israel..”226  
Moreover, knowing that Palestinians were always hopeful to gain some preference 
over Israelis in their relations with the U.S., he promised Arafat that the U.S. would 
do all it could to strengthen Palestinian-American relations. Clinton got what he 
hoped for on the 29th of April. Palestinian leaders decided against declaring statehood 
on May 4th. The Palestinian Central Council decided that it would resume its 
discussions on that matter in June after the Israeli elections were concluded. If 
Netanyahu stayed in power, they could still announce the state; if not, they would 
give negotiations a chance.227 
The 17th of May brought great news for Clinton. Ehud Barak became the new 
Israeli Prime Minister. Barak belonged to the same realist school of thought as Rabin. 
From their perspective, “the balance of power in the Middle East cast the United 
States in a central role.” Despite this perspective, once in power, Barak criticized the 
American role in the Wye Plantation agreement. Barak was against the intensive 
negotiating role America played and the involvement of the CIA in determining 
whether or not the Palestinians were fulfilling their security commitments.228 Clinton 
decided to adhere to Barak’s request and announced that the U.S. would be only a 
facilitator, helping the parties to reach an agreement without imposing its own 
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views.229 The American commitment towards this approach was clear when Albright 
decided to postpone her trip to the Middle East in August. The purpose of this visit 
was to get the stalled Wye agreement back on track and also to revive the Syrian-
Israeli peace talks. Albright’s decision came after Barak requested that delay to sort 
out problems with the Palestinians over the timing of the next pullout of Israeli troops 
from the West Bank.230 Another point of agreement between Israel and the U.S. was 
the prioritizing of the Syrian track over the Palestinian one.  During his first visit to 
the U.S., Barak told Clinton that from a strategic point of view, the Syrian track was 
more important to Israel than the Palestinian one at that time.231 
The new strengthening of the American-Israeli relations caused a threat to the 
Palestinians. Their hopes of taking advantage of previously deteriorating American-
Israeli relations faded away. The situation on the ground was also alarming. 
Palestinians started to lose patience as they needed to see something real 
implemented on the ground. The Wye agreement was still on hold, and the advent of 
Barak did not produce any improvement; on the contrary, new settlements were being 
built. The new emphasis on Syria made them feel left out. 
The stalled peace process was revived by the signing of a new agreement in 
Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt on the 4th of September 1999. During the last phase of 
negotiating the new agreement, Albright delayed her trip to the Middle East. Most of 
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her trip was dedicated to the Syrian-Israeli peace process. Despite Albright’s 
announcement during her visit to the Middle East that she was not going to mediate 
in those negotiations, 232 she intervened in the last two days to solve the Palestinian-
Israeli differences. The breakthrough came after she held a meeting with Arafat, 
where she presented to him the latest Israeli positions and sealed his acceptance of a 
bargain. Albright did not present any ideas from the American side, and she called 
her role during these negotiations as a “handmaiden.”233 The central part of the 
agreement was a plan to negotiate a framework for a permanent settlement between 
the two parties by the 15th of February 2000 and the conclusion of detailed talks by 
September.234 
10. Camp David: 
After the signing of the Sharm El-Sheikh agreement, Israel and the U.S. 
decided that it was time to concentrate on the Syrian-Israeli peace agreement. Their 
efforts did not reach any advancement, which again made them direct their attention 
to the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Clinton knew that he had only a few months 
left as President of the United States, and reaching a final status agreement between 
Palestinians and Israelis would be a great personal achievement. The administration 
knew that it had limited time to conclude an agreement, not only because of the 
limited time left for Clinton in the White House, but also because of the upcoming 
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Israeli elections, which would delay the implementation of any agreement for at least 
90 days.235 
When Clinton announced the Camp David summit meeting, he said that he 
was hoping that the summit would resolve the deepest matters dividing Israelis and 
Palestinians. He also said that these issues were so well-known that the solutions 
should be within sight.236 The American attitude showed a complete disregard of the 
Palestinian way of thinking and total harmony with Israel’s. Arafat was clear from the 
beginning that the timing was not right to hold the summit. He insisted that further 
preparations were needed before starting the summit.237 The issues to be discussed 
were known, just as Clinton had said, but solutions were not within sight as he had 
predicted. 
The summit was surrounded by a high level of confidentiality. Before the 
summit started, the U.S. team refused to give any details about the role they were 
going to play or the type of the negotiations. It was not clear whether the issues were 
going to be discussed as a whole or issue by issue, and the Americans did not say if 
they were going to present their ideas or not.238 
After the eventual collapse of the summit, Clinton refused to take any 
responsibility for the failure of the negotiations. Clinton broke his promise made to 
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Arafat before the summit that Arafat would not be blamed if talks failed239 and 
clearly criticized Arafat, though he denied it. He praised Barak over and over for 
making what he described as “bold decisions”. Clinton said that “Barak was ready to 
step up to something that President Arafat wasn’t yet ready to step up to.” Clinton 
stated that the Camp David talks were not a complete failure, as “significant progress 
was made on the core issues.” An agreement was not reached despite this progress. In 
fact, the only agreement made was the agreement between the two parties that 
“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.” 240  
Blaming Arafat for the failure of the summit further demonstrated the 
American insistence on siding with Israel and the American failure to understand the 
Palestinian perspective and realities. The administration was incapable of and 
unwilling to comprehend the dramatic realities that would have resulted if the 
Palestinians accepted the Israeli proposal. Moreover, the U.S. had two reasons behind 
its criticism of Arafat. First, it wanted to improve Barak’s political situation in Israel. 
During a phone call between Saeb Ereqat and Dennis Ross after the failure of the 
summit, Ross clearly answered Erekat’s question about the reason behind blaming 
Arafat: “Barak needs this so he can face his internal difficulties in Israel.”241 The 
second reason was justifying the American policy of supporting the opressive Israeli 
occupation, politically as well as economically. The U.S. House of Representatives, 
with only 30 dissenting votes, adopted a bipartisan resolution praising Barak and 
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condemning President Arafat for rejecting the proposal. The resolution was seen as a 
message to both the Israeli and the American public that an overwhelming consensus 
of U.S. lawmakers believed that the Palestinians were not really committed to the 
peace process and that even stronger U.S. backing of the Israeli occupation and its 
right wing government was necessary. 242 
The shortsighted vision of the Clinton administration could not be described 
better than the way former Special Assistant for Arab-Israel Affairs, Rob Malley, put 
it once he left office: 
[W]e often hear about Ehud Barak’s unprecedented offer and Yasser 
Arafat’s uncompromising no. Israel is said to have made a historic, 
generous proposal, which the Palestinians, once again seizing the 
opportunity to miss an opportunity, turned down. In short, the failure to 
reach a final agreement is attributed, without notable dissent, to Yasser 
Arafat. As orthodoxies go, this is a dangerous one…[I]t fails to capture 
why what so many viewed as a generous Israeli offer, the Palestinians 
viewed as neither generous, nor Israeli, nor, indeed, as an offer. Worse it 
acts as a harmful constraint on American policy by offering up a single, 
convenient culprit – Arafat – rather than a more nuanced and realistic 
analysis.243 
 
The American and Israeli announcement about the great Israeli compromises made 
by Barak did not reflect the truth. What the Israelis offered during the summit was 
more than what other Israeli governments had offered, but still what was offered to 
the Palestinians was far less than international law and the international community 
granted them. Americans and Israelis announced that Israeli negotiators offered 
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Palestinians control over 90-95 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a 
demilitarized Palestinian state, the return of a number of Palestinian refugees. They 
claimed that the main issue of disagreement was Jerusalem.244 
However, the truth is that the 90-95 percent of the land offered to the 
Palestinians was a trap. This land would have been divided and surrounded by Israeli 
settlements and bypass roads that would have divided the Palestinian state into 
cantons that would have been strategically controlled by Israel. On the issue of 
refugees, the main disagreement was on refuting the right of return. Barak refused to 
acknowledge the fact that Israel bore responsibility for the creation of the problem of 
Palestinian refugees. Moreover, the number of refugees that were going to return 
would only be allowed to return as part of a family reunification program, not as a 
Palestinian right.245 On the issue of Jerusalem, Israel refused to give Palestinians real 
sovereignty over the eastern part of the city. The Americans presented different 
proposals whose aim was to break down the notion of sovereignty so that each side 
could claim to exercise some degree of control over the areas that mattered the most 
to each party. None of the American proposals was applicable on the ground, which 
made Arafat refuse them all. 246 
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11. The end of Peace 
 Despite the failure of the Camp David Summit, contacts between Palestinians 
and Israelis were not suspended. Between August and September 2000, more than 50 
meetings were held in Jerusalem between the two parties. The total collapse of the 
peace came after Ariel Sharon, the then right-wing opposition leader, visited Haram 
Sharif in September 2000. Sharon’s visit was approved by Barak, who sent along 
with him hundreds of soldiers for protection, which led to massive Palestinian 
demonstrations. The Israeli response was violent as they suppressed those 
demonstrations with an extensive use of force.  
During the escalation of the Israeli aggression, the Clinton administration 
approved the largest ever sale of military helicopters to Israel. Those helicopters were 
repeatedly used against Palestinian civilians and civilian facilities. Despite the fact 
that U.S. laws forbid the use of American military equipment against civilians, the 
administration kept its eyes closed. A Pentagon official was reported saying that the 
U.S. would not “second-guess” an Israeli commander who gave his orders to use 
these helicopters against civilian targets.247 
The attitude of Congress towards the second Intifada helped the 
administration in supporting Israel and its aggressive behavior. Despite the growing 
number of human rights reports criticizing Israel for its aggression, American 
senators signed a letter to Clinton on the 12th of October, urging him to “express 
solidarity with Israel at this critical moment” and “condemn the Palestinian campaign 
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of violence.” On the 25th of October, the House passed a non-binding resolution, 
expressing its solidarity with Israel and condemning the Palestinian leadership for 
encouraging the violence. The resolution also urged the administration to veto any 
UN Security Council resolution dealing with the Intifada.248   
Barak encouraged Clinton to propose an American peace plan. Throughout 
the peace process, Clinton did intervene on some occasions personally, but proposing 
a comprehensive peace plan had been a precedent not only to him but also throughout 
the years of American involvement in the conflict.249 On the 23rd of December 2000, 
Clinton presented his proposal to both sides. Being so eager to reach an agreement, 
Clinton asked all friendly states to intervene in persuading Arafat to accept the 
proposal.250  However, the proposal was rejected by both sides. Even Barak backed 
away from it and strongly announced that he would not “sign any document that will 
transfer sovereignty over Temple Mount to Palestinians.” On the Palestinian side, the 
proposal was perceived as a “trap” more than an opportunity. It was perceived as an 
Israeli plan aimed at canceling Palestinian national rights and the right of return 
granted to Palestinians by international law and UN resolutions.251 At this point, the 
American role in the peace process became marginal, and negotiations were held 
between Palestinians and Israelis without American intervention. 
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Conclusion 
After identifying and evaluating the elements of continuity and discontinuity 
of American foreign policy towards Palestine, the author has reached the conclusion 
that there have been constant variables that have governed American approach 
towards Palestine between the Nixon and the Clinton administrations. These variables 
played a key role in undermining and liquidating Palestinian interests and rights, and 
they will continue to do the same in the future. 
These constant variables are the direct result of the special relation between 
the United States of America and Israel. Even the change in American general 
behavior from realism to neo-liberalism, and the change in the international arena 
after the end of the Cold War, did not shack or alter the nature of this relationship. 
The US tends to adopt the Israeli interpretation of the conflict, thus neglecting the 
Palestinian perspective. The US has refused to admit that the root of the Palestinian 
problem is the creation of the state of Israel on Palestinian land. For the United State, 
the existence of the state of Israel in the Middle East is a de'facto reality and that 
Palestinian and Arab attitude towards Israel as derived from unreasoned hate and 
prejudice  
During decades of American involvement in the conflict, the U.S. has 
committed itself to serve Israeli interests and security with the attempt to achieve 
political gains on behalf of Israel. To help Israel in acquiring Palestinian recognition, 
the U.S. committed itself, through the secret pledge it gave to Israel in September 
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1975, during the Sinai II Agreement, not to start any political dialogue with the 
P.L.O. until it recognized the state of Israel and its right to exist. 
After achieving this goal, through the Oslo Accord, the U.S. went a step 
further in serving Israeli interests as it kept on exerting power on Palestinians to sign 
agreements that are way far from their lawful political aspirations. Hence, the U.S. 
rarely exert power on Israel when it is not complying with the agreements it signed 
with Palestinians or when it violates International Law to undermine Palestinian 
rights. The U.S. has been welling to exert power on Israel only when its interests 
contradicted with those of Israel.  
The United States generally does not respect or value the United Nations or 
international law. For the US, international law and the UN are mere tools to serve its 
interests as well as a weapon against those states that defy its power and interests. 
Having the power of veto in the Security Council, the U.S. has repeatedly isolated 
itself from international consensus on the question of Palestine, vetoing any UN 
resolution Israel does not accept by using lame excuses to justify its position. 
Claiming that the resolution is not balanced is one of the most used excuses by the 
U.S. 
Furthermore, the U.S. during the Clinton era in particular, worked on 
liquidating Palestinians rights granted by international law through manipulating 
legal terms and evacuating UN resolutions related to the question of Palestine from 
their essence by adopting the Israeli interpretation of these resolutions. 
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As an example the US has changed the status of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip from "Occupied Territory" to "Disputed Territory" in adherence to Israeli claim 
that the rules of the fourth Geneva Convention could not be applicable there. 
Moreover, the US focused on resolution 242 and 338 to be the base for any peace 
talks between Palestinians and Israelis. This way the US intentionally bypassed a 
number of UN resolutions whereby, if referred to they would have strengthened 
Palestinian position during the peace negotiations. 
Adopting Israeli interpretation of the conflict and having the Israeli-American 
relations as the starting point for the Palestinian-American relations, made the US 
administrations blindfoldedly blame any escalation of the conflict on the Palestinians. 
This fact was best shown when the second Palestinian Intifada started in the year 
2000. The U.S. interpreted the Intifada as a maneuver Arafat used to force his 
demands on Israel after the failure of the Camp David disregarding Arafat’s repeated 
warnings that Sharon’s visit to the Haram Sharif would be catastrophic.      
For decades the U.S. administrations have supported Israel in creating facts on 
the ground unilaterally, prejudicing the outcome of negotiations in any peace 
settlement. The US went all the way in its support to Israel violating international law 
through providing financial aid to Israeli illegal settlements. The myth of “natural 
growth” of settlements was the main excuse the US used to justify its support. 
Kissinger’s comment on the Rabat meeting which took place November 1973 
between the CIA deputy director and Arafat during the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks 
gives a clear example of this strategy. For Kissinger, the meeting was successful 
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because it achieved his goals, which aimed at gaining time and preventing any 
assaults during the early peace talks.  
The American intervention in the conflict is mainly derived from its concern 
over the escalation of the conflict into a regional unrest. The U.S. has vast interest in 
maintaining and protecting the pro-American Arab governments. This is true for the 
U.S. as the escalation of the conflict may cause national unrest in neighboring Arab 
states.  As a result, any escalation of the conflict will cause the Arab public to 
condemn Israel and ask their governments to cut its diplomatic relations with it. After 
the signing of the peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis the U.S. 
concentrated on the Syrian-Israeli track. The Hebron massacre and the major unrest it 
caused drove back the U.S. to the Palestinian track. While, as soon as an agreement 
was reached, the Palestinian issue became a less priority on the American priority list. 
As a consequence of these variables, Palestinians should no longer perceive 
the United States. as the sole option for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as it 
is not a reliable and honest broker. Never-the-less, the fact that the U.S. is the major 
power in the world, it is imperative for Palestinians to consider reevaluating their 
approach towards the U.S., and look upon other options that will be presented in the 
recommendations bellow. 
Recommendations: 
Palestinians have to depend on a reliable third party, capable of understanding 
their problem from their own point of view and have the political power and well to 
serve Palestinian interests. This reliable third party is the European Union. It should 
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be targeted by diplomatic means to play that role. There are several factors that make 
the E.U. capable of being a broker of peace in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. First the 
fact that Europe shares a long history with the Middle East and Palestine makes it 
more capable than the U.S. to defend the Palestinian perspective on the conflict. 
European states did realize Palestinians as a separate people giving them their lawful 
rights through the United Nations opining political dialogue with the P.L.O While the 
U.S. defied these rights. 
It is true that at this time the U.S. is the major power in the international 
arena, but since the creation of the E.U., Europe is trying to spread its influence in the 
world and at some occasions defy U.S. dominance. Palestinians should use this fact to 
serve their interests and use the contradictions between the U.S. and the E.U. to 
persuade the E.U. to defy the U.S. when working against Palestinian interests. 
Strengthening the political ties with the E.U. should be accompanied by a 
strong social movement. It is recommended to work with the Arabs and Palestinians 
holding European citizenship in order to create a network among them to be 
responsible for presenting the Palestinian issue to the European public from a 
Palestinian point of view. Moreover, Palestinian universities should work on 
improving their student exchange programs with the European universities to enhance 
cultural dialogue and interaction between the two people. The European 
Neighborhood policy is an excellent platform to be used for social exchange and for 
presenting the Palestinian issue to the European public. 
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On the American front, Palestinians should use civil society institutions for 
their benefit by strengthening their ties with Palestinian-Americans.  Despite the fact 
that changing America mentality towards Palestinians and mobilizing that force for 
their benefit may take decades, still Palestinians should not give up on this front. The 
tremendous public response against the Israeli army within the American society after 
the Hebron massacre is a great example of how sensitive the American society is 
towards the Israeli violations in Palestine. Ignorance is a major factor behind 
American public support towards Israel and if this point is well managed by 
Palestinians, a tremendous change within the American public opinion would be 
achieved in favor of Palestine. Two steps should be taken to introduce the Palestinian 
issue to the American public: first, hiring a public relations company to work on 
improving the Palestinian image within the American society; second, using 
Palestinian-Americans to create pressure groups solely interested in the issue of 
Palestine,  to undermine the role of AIPAC and other pro-Israeli lobbyists. 
Moreover, Palestinians should work with Arab states to give up the unilateral 
track of peace negotiations with Israel. Using a multilateral track would help in 
strengthening the Palestinian position against the Israeli's by depriving Israel from the 
political gains it achieved in the past on the expense of Palestinian interests.  
Internally, reforming Palestinian institutions should be a priority to the 
Palestinians. Reforming and strengthening institutions would help improving 
Palestinian political performance on all levels, nationally as well as internationally. 
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Being seen as credible and trustworthy, Palestinian arguments would be spread 
internationally to a greater level gaining credibility and trust. 
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